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I, John Toothy Kelley,. was born February 19,. 1926 in Saint Pault M:tnn. 
We mved to Chicago in 19U- and I graduated from Saint George Hilh School in 
1944. Joined the Navy a mnth later, and eventually was assigned to the 
IST 914. Seventh neet, China Theatre •. 
Discharged in 1946, I enrolled in the pre-law program of Loyola Universiv 
in Chicago. Transf'ezwd to the law school in 1943, and under the combined 
degree program., received Q B.S.S.S. degree in February,. 1950. Joined the 
Society of Jesus the following A.U.f~u.at. .14 .•. regent I taught Modern European 
'. 
History end Caesar at Saint Ignatiu.s High sChool,. Oleveland. At present am a 
first year theologian at West Baden CoJ~eg •• 
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ControNrS,y over the FU't.h ~t ball mlObed a cnscendo in OUl" t1me. 
Ita maifest abuse bT ap1fth ~ Oonmnm1ata,.ft .. _11 .. b;r 80me ot the 
ftInld.rlg t1gureo or our national labor unions, end pl"Otesaiorual r8C~, 
cauaea 8Wr.r tb1.llldag Amar.tom to pauae 8Dt1 ponder t..hese fa l'I'Ords from tbtJ 
Eill 01: R.1ghta ot our Oonat.1t,ut,1on. NO PlmSOli ••• SUAU:. BE OOYi:'~'llJJ'J} nt A1 rr. 
CRllm~.AL CASTi TO BE A WmlE'SS AGAnrsT H";~£LF. 
Att.ent.ton. then, is d1rected to tI'l6 lfitth AIaldamt these days because of 
its use, or abuae, 1.'1 Congreseiona1irMtst1gationa. It 18 not the ~lurpoae of 
thiII paper to question the right of oongresldonal oor:mtteea to conduct 1nYes-
tigatione. That right. 18 well eatab11abed. fbe queotton 10, rather, ~ 
it Bhall be ~ught to 1lfIlUght by the ~ shelter ot the Fifth ~ ~ 
~, in ccmJurwUon w.l.th ~ and ~& u:T ~ft foellng that it 
is bet.ter that nille guUtq go ~ than that GOO 1nnooent be harmed through 
reoeal ot the p:ri.vi.lGge. others, such _ R1cl'w'd 3a .. lI.I'iting in the ~ ... 
Bar Joumtj, -act t..'lat. the privlloee aga1n8t aalt-4..nm."1m1nltJon 10 1m - .4. .... 
~ hom ot • d18tant, aee and ot pmaeouUng praat.1cGs whiCh no longer pre-
van. .l third group, led by Judge &Anull IIotstadter of Nour York, VOVld suspend 
the privilege 1n certa1n C'\)u and subatituto • guarlDtee of i~V f'l"om 
proeecut.lon lor tm:f or1.m the 1dtneas ~ Nwa11n the couroe ()f the inter-
1 
2 
rogation., The 1m and most devoted group 1f\')uld not on.l.y' retain the privilege" 
but insist that .. dr_ no inference of guilt from its invocation. !hese last 
have as their eloquent spokesman the Dean of the Harvard La School, Ernest 
Grinold, 1\Ihose 11 ttle book, !h! Fif~ .Anendmellt To4!l;, has had ttenol'l'lDUS 
influence not only on the 1. publio but on :recent legal decisions • ..l 'this 
rather super:f'1clal volume has been d&vastat1n~ answered by Sidney Book. 
However, neither author calls into question the need for such an,Amendment nor 
its raison 2'e,tre, but genera~ confines his attention to the internees of 
guilt that we uy or lU,Y not draw from the plea of the Fifth Amendment. 
The intellectual confusion surrounding this Amendment is turt.."ter complies ..... 
ted by unblushing poll'~cru. bias. About thirty' years ago llberal opinion in 
our nation .... lcomed congressional investigation of crime, mnopol;y', and eratt, 
whil.e deploring the occasional resort to the Fifth Amendment by Bome ot the 
leading wltness.s. Today, liberal thought takes II dim view of congressional 
investigations" espec1al.l¥ of Comnm1.8m.. a~ so far from condemning those 'Who 
'. pJ.ead the Fifth Allendment, they' regard tbe~ -instead as champions of civil 
liberties who have taken thetr stand on the basis of principle, or who have 
nobl\r cHJIdained to inform on friends. 
"'Iftlat think ye of the Fifth A:pmdmtmt?" has thus become one of the burrW2g 
questions of the dq. Now one will think mre or leSI of the Amendment depend-
ing on whether or not it il • natural right of me. Arul~sis of naturalla. 
natural rights, man and the State should yield the anner., revealing the 
privUege as a fundamental right or • merelY rescindable rule of procedure. 
1 
Sidney Hook, Commn ~n.e ~ ~ Fittq Amendnaat (New York, 1957), 13. 
3 
Another approach, and. the one which I have adopted, is to search the cases. 
commentaries, and legal literature for arguments Which would indicate whether 
or not the right is natural. 
~le final question we wlll consider is also war~ disputed--whether 
invocation of the Amendment cre;ates an inference su:tf'icient to warrant dis-
charge from key poSitions, and other civil penal.tiee. In other words, was-
the Fifth Amendment intended not only to protect the individual i'rom producing 
evidenoe of his own partiC\V', but also to leave his reputation in the same 
pristine state after his invocation as before? 
We wi1l1'lOl1 take up the analysis of these three issues, that by weighing 
the evidence earetulJ.y, _ ID63' reach true and reasonable conclusions • 
. ' -
CHAPTER II 
Whenever in the oourse of this thesis I shall refer to the Fi.f'th Amen' .... 
I shall always intend that single clause which states that no person shell be 
co~lled. to be • wi tnes. against hims.U. rus formula had its historical on .. 
gins in English ecclesiastical and CODlJ¥)n law. The devel<;p .nt, according to 
wignDre, 'AS along two distinct and parallel lines, lithe one an outgrowth of th It 
other, succeeding it, and yet beginning just before the other comes to an end. 
The firat is the history of the opposition to the '!! ... o... fti ....... o .... i ... o' oirth of the .0 .... 
clesiaatical co urts J the s.cond is the history of the opposition to the crim-
inating question in the common-law courts, i.e., of the present privilege in 
its modern shape.wl 
Prior to the time ot Willim the conciua~r, bishops sat as judges in the 
~ 
popular courts. William put an end to this by requiring bishops to decide just 
those cases which cams under ecclesiastical law. Thus sprang up • separate 
system and a double judicature, the ecclesiastical and the civil courts. Up to 
this time the compurgation system was still in full force in the popular and 
2 
royal courts. Thus a detendant could clear himself by swearing to his Oft 
1John Henry 'W'igDDN_ Evidence. "rei ed., (Boston" 1940>. nIl, 277. 
2xb1d. 280. 
-
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innocence and by bringing in • couple of oath-helpers to do llkewise. It ie 
interesting to note that the new ecclesiastical courts lmre the first to do 
awII:I with this practice. The oaths of t)tho and Boniface in the years 1236 and 
1272 respectively.. were a distinct innovation and pledged the accused to ananr 
truJ.y • .3 This ns followed by an interro~ation or the defendant concerning the 
assential details of the affair. The old cOlDl;>urgation oath consisted mere13 in 
daring and succeeding to pronounce a formula of innocence 'fIil.jrJl operated ot 
itself as a decision. The new oath, h01fE)ver .. furnished material for the judge 
to reach his own personal conviction and deCiaion.4 
As the years passed.. the oaths of Otho and Boniface nna so interpreted 
that the defendant could not bP made the subject of a .fishing expedition, but 
could only be tnterrogated if there are Bone sort of presentment, or wi tneas .. ~ 
or bad repute. 'This was expressed in the Latin i'ol"lll'fll.. RLicet.!!!.!2 tenettu.; !!' 
~s,:! £~dere, tamen 2rod1tus l!.! !amlllll tenetur sek!1ll1l oatande,!! ut.rum Eossit 
!2! iDnocenti-! ostende~ ~ se1pau-'ll 12g~r,e.· . "VIh11e no one is required to 
betra;,r himself', nevertheless one reputed to 'be quiltq can be riquired to presen1 
himself' and vindicate his innocence if he ean." Thiedictum according to the 
h1storim Hallam had ita origin in English COlDlll)n 1_. Bnt l'-ks PlO llk'TDY' bulvf8l'l. 
3Jusjurandum calwmiav in causis ecclesiastiois et civilibus de ''''erltate 
dicenda in spiritualibus, quo ut veritas tacillus aper1atur et causae cel.nus 
ternrl.nentur, statuimus praestari de eetero in regno Angliae secundum aanonicd 
at legit1mas sanction.a, obtenta consuetudine in contrarl.wn non obstante. As 
quoted bJ." Wigloore, 278. Author's translationt iYa ordain and establish that 
pencef'orth in the IiDgdom of England .. in all oases oivil or ecclesiastic, lin 
oath to tell the truth shall be exacted mder pain of' canonioal and legal penal-
ty, in order that the truth may be mre e.aily oi$Cov.:-red and causee n:nre 
fi,uickly terminated. any practice to the contr817 notwi thstand1ng. 
4wtemre, 281. 
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of human :f'r&edom, this bastion, too, began to decay. In the anxiety ot fifteen io 
tb and sixteenth century England over the influx ot heresy, judges came to de-
mand less and lass in the WtI¥ of presentnwnt or bad repute, and to subject .!St 
luspected perf!lon to interrogation under the oath to tell the truth. 
'l'he first man to challenge sucoessfully this right to the ecclBsiastical 
courts to examine a suspect "ex officio maroa wes John Lilburn in 1631. Lil-
- -
bum was suspected of inporting and purveying heretical and aeeli t10us 11 tara-
ture. 'Uhen put on his oath to answer the questions of the court, he refused .. 
and eventuaJ.:b' his retueal was sustained. lie must caretuJ.ly note, however, 
that LUburn's protest wus againat interrogation in the absence of • formal 
accusation, not agc1nst interrogation .. such. In his trial he clearly state. 
that he is perfectly willing to anSrter all questions prpperly placed, but that 
the present investigation Yrdunlat'ul ai.nce he was never tormal.ly' charged with 
at\V Crime.5 Lilb1lftl had never clrd.ned the right to refuse abaolutel;r to answer 
• criminating question" he had merel,y demanded a proper proceeding of present-
n:unt or accusation.. But now this once vit44 .distinction comes to be ignored. 
Around 16$0 defendants. began to claim flat:b" that no man is bound to inoriminat 
himself on IlI\Y oharge (no matter how properly" instituted). or in any court (not 
mereq in ecclesiastical or Star Chamber tribunals). Judges began to concede 
the claim and by the end of the seventeenth century the right was estabUshed 
and extended to include an ordinary witness as _11 88 the party charged. But 
the privilege 'irQ .. matter or judiCial decision only. It was not included in 
Stuburn1s Jrial,- Howmf.l State Trials, m. l.3lS (1631). 
6wig:coore, 299, ~ v. !!! Jers!l,t 211 US 78 (1908). 
1 
either the Engl1ah BUl of Rights or the Petition of Right, and of course had 
not even been thought of untU long after Jl'agna Carta. Or as Professor wigmore 
puts itl ltihatever it •• s lIOrtb to the American Conat1tution-makers ot 1789, it 
was not worth IlBntioni.."1g to the English Corurt.1tution-D8nders ot l.689.-7 
In equi\y ooUl'tra the privil!t ge w. also becoming • f:1.xture. lit 1731 Lord 
HardwicD in denying discovery in an action for rents and profits said that 
"there is no rule more estabUahed in equity than that a person shall not be 
obl.1ged to discover ..mat 11111 subject him to • penalty or atVthing in the natlm 
8 
ot a penalty.- It see_ fair to conclude that by' the middle 'of the eighteenth 
century they were giving tull l'8oognition to the privilep in equity. "!he 
scarcity or non-axist8nce ot reported ca.es in which the privilege was applied 
in ci vU actions at common 1_ may be explained by the tact that from the .ar~ 
l6OO18 to the middle ot the nineteenth centU1'Y parties were disqualified 
witneuea and 80, at least after the middle ot the 1600' I, were interesiie4 
part1es • .9 
.. 
Following the Revolution of 1688, U ... ·have seen, Bngllsh cr1iir1nal pr0.-
cedure underwent a marked alteration, and the queetioning of accused defendantG 
soon ceased ent1rel¥. But while this ohange undoubtedly testU'ies to the gl"01II-
ing inn_nee or the maxim against self-d.ncrimination. the manner in which it 
.... etfected was by' extension from cinl to crimina cases of the rule that • 
party is not a coupetent witness on accOl.Ult of interest. "The result was that 
7Ibid • .301. 
-a As quoted by E. fde )forgan, .Selt-Incrimi.nation .... .!:!!!!. ~ !!,!., LUIV 
(December, 1949), 9. 
9lbid. 
-
8 
henceforth the Jlbuth ot an accused. and his 'Wite'. as "WOll, was cl08ed whether 
!.2!. or against himlelfJ and it is in this form that the immunity of accused 
persona passed to the _ncan colonies, balanced., that 18, by the correspnndiftj 
disability. Not tmtll 1878, following a simUar reform in several ot the state 
was the right to testify in their own behal!, under oath, accorded defendants 
in the national. courts • .,10 
S1nce interrogation of the accused waS not undertaken in the colonies atte 
1700, it was not one of the abuses which led to the American Revolution. As it 
was the correction of those abuses which was the prim.ar:r purpose of the revo1u-
tioniata, they were not gravely' conoemed with the privUege. It is not, for 
instance, mentioned in the Declaration of Independence, which l.uts twnty-aine 
grievances against the Brt tish Crown. Neither the Declvation ot Rirf.hts by the 
Stamp Act Congress of 176S nor that of the Continental Congress ot ln6 inolud& 
the privUege in their enumerations ot fun.<.i.anlantal rights. The section ot the 
Northwest ordinance corresponding to the ptfth Amendment omits the privUege. 
The tramer. of eight of the original s\ate constitutions and the crea.tors 
ot the Federal Constitution found no place for the privUege in their respectiv 
instruants. . While Thomas Jefferson and Richard Henry Lee protested vigorousl1 
against the omission from the Constitution of freedom of religion, freedom of 
the press .. the habeas corpus guarantee. trial. by' jur,y, etc., they were silent 
as the grave about the exclusion of the self-incrimination pri v:Llege.ll 
l~rd S. Corwin, "'the Suprelll! Court Construction ot the Sell'-Incrimln ... 
tion Clauae,. 1ttchigan ~ Revielr,& XXXII (November. 1930), 10. 
llthe Peo;ele Shall ~, staft of Soc. So. Dept., Uld.v. ot Chi. (Ohic£tj,o, 
1950), !;""3~O. 
9 
With this background it ma;y seem fA little singular that the :}rivl.lege was 
incorporated into the American Bill of Rights at Q].l. One view attributed the 
inclusion to -French influence and ;)ointa out that the subject was actively agi-
tated there durine the revoluticnru.7period. Representatives to tile National 
Assenbl.1 (Estates General) from every DeparteIlmlt in France were instructed to 
insist tq)on a provision against sel£-Llcriml~ation. other scholars feel that 
the stream of influence was toward France !rom America at that time. Perhaps 
we can conclude with Mr. Williams of the New York Bar that "an internediate 
viErw seems .flual.l$ tenable-the exch.ange of libertarian ideas between the 
Un! ted States and France in the decade of the 1130' s.,,12 
Whatever the £low of innuence" the privilege against self-incrimination 
found its way into our Federal. Bill of Rights drawn up in 1791. The fiI'st case 
under the Fifth Amendment did not arise until 1885. almost one hundred years 
later. V~by the delay? Before answering this question we must answer that lOON 
ftmdamental question ~ the framers incorporated the Amendment at all since 
., 
defendants had not +.estified at crirJinal t~ls for almost one hundred years 
(since 1700). 
The ans'"er is sl11llle. In the a:il.rly state oonstitutions, as in the FU'th 
Amendment, immunity .froll sel.f-inorimination is lis ted merel3' as one of a whole 
-
,areal of privileges which \lere in t.~e n.ain of interest to accused persons and 
to no others. That isto say. the problem being dealt with was the L."1?r::nElr:r!nt 
of the lot of accused persons, a concentration of interest W'n.ich was due to the 
tradition of the harshness of the comrron In in this respect. and to the terribl 
"Problems of the Fifth A.'U8ndment," Fordham Law 1 .-
10 
severity of the English penal code in the eighteenth century. At the same time, 
since the constl tutional provisLnsacntioned above did not overrule the com-
mn law in eJroluding an accused from the witness stand, their stipulation for 
hts :tmrrmnlty tal'.sn by it1:lelf becarne')ointless. If only, therefore, to save the 
framers of these provisions from t.'le charge of having loaded them with a mean-
ingless tautology, their languap had to be given other than its lit.ra1. sig-
nificanoe, and the conm::>n 1&1'1 was at hand to supply' t~is in rich neasure.13 
Now the commn law laad Qlrea<tr established by 1789 that the pr-lvilebEt pro-
tected witnesses as well as de£enda11'tsj that it protected the incrL::ti.',ating 
£Qpe,r~ of the defendantJ that it protected the defendant and witnesses in civil 
proceedings from revealing matter which mr"ld subject them to criminal prose-
cution. For alIll)st one hmldred years then, until 188,5, the criminal co'.ns 
interpreted the Fifth Alnendment in the light of CO:mrno:1 law. No appeal was ever 
made because the decisions of the comnlOn law were too well established. However 
in ~ v. United states. specific provisfan of an act of Congress was in-
volved .. with the result that recourse against it to the COII/.l'OOn 1_ Unsupported 
by the Constitution would have been futili, for llIlSupported comr.r:m law must 
yield to statutory 1_.14 
In the Boyd case the Suprene Court held 'tt'lnt seizure or compulsory pro-
duction of a i1llll' 8 private papers for use as evidence against him is eq,ui valent 
to compelling him to be • witness against himself and therefore within the pro-
13&tb Boyd v. United state:; and Counselman v. Hitchcock, infra, are 
replete witli"TiiV'ocatl'ons of the OOl'::nfDn 1-.' · 
, . 14ab"{d v. United States" n6 US 616 (1835). For specific treatumt of 
t:n.is 'Oro em, or. conrtri.. ff-13. 
11 
hibition of the Fifth Aliendmnt. Slx years later, in CounselIl~ v. !,!itchcoc!st 
tr'1e smne court held that the pri vileee extends to • ;witness called -1;.0 testify 
before • grand jur.y investigating violations of the Interstate Conmtrce L_, 
and was not limited t.o caseS of criminal prosecution against the witness him-
selt. In that Case the Court established the rule that the object of the Fifth 
Amendment was to "ensure that a person should not be compelled, when acting u 
a witness in any investigation to give testimorx,y which might tend to show that 
he himself had committed a crime. The pri.vi1ege is limited to oriminal matters 
but is as broad as the mischief af~ainst which it seeks to guard.tllS 
In ,!COa!"!S: v. Arndstein the ~rlvilege waS further enlarged to eniJrace 
civil prooeedings. Citing the Coul1seL>nan case, the Suprens Court in 1926 held 
that "'the priviJ.ege is not ordinaril;;r dependent upon tlle nature of the pro-
ceedings, but rather 'f!JIiq be invoked whenever the answer might tend to subject 
to criminal responsibility him who gives it. The privUege proteots II mere 
'witness e fully as it does one who is alf!o. a party defendant.,,16 
'. There remained one fina1 question--'Whether the privilege could be stretch 
to embrace hearings in congressional investig&tiona. An af£irmative <iW.swer was 
given in 195, in t..lte three cases of Quin..Yl v. !Jnited St.ta~, Emspak v. United 
,2.U1tasJ and ~ v. United ~.tes.17 Thus we see that a witness E.! !.Sl. pro-
~edin~ whatsoever in whioh testinJ)ny is legally required ~ refuse to answer 
fm:.{ question when his answer might be used against him in a f'uin:.re legal 
-
15142 us 547 (1890). 
16266 VI 34 (1926). 
17349 US 155. 190 .. 219 (1954). 
12 
crininal proceeding, or which might uncover' further evidence against him .. 
To claim the privilege it is not necessary that your answer of itself 
wotud support a oonviction, for it is sufficient that "answers to the questions 
asked. • • 'W:Juld have furnished a link in the chain of evidence needed in a 
_ ............ _......... ......_---
18 prosecution of' petitioned ••• " The court here reasons, and I think rightly 
so, that a man convicts himself' as effectively by revealing the missing piece, 
as by disclosing the entire puzzle of his cnne. 
The witness or defendant must explicitly claim (though in no fixed forll1ula 
his constitutional immunity or he will be considered to have waived i tJ but he 
.i8 not the final judge of the soundness of his cllim. The prooess for deter-
mining the valid! ty ot the wi tne8s t claim was neatly SUllll!8d up by Chief Justioe 
John Marshall, 
When a question 18 propounded it belongs to the court to consider whether 
an;r direct answer to it can ir:1plicate the witness. It this be decided in 
the negative, then he may answer it without violating the privilege which 
is secured to him by In. It III direct answer to it ~ i."'1criminate him, 
then he must be the s ole judge what his answer would be. The court cannot 
participate with him in this judpement. because they cannot deCide on the 
effect of his anner Tdthout knowing ..... t it would be, and a disclosure of 
that fact to the judge would strip him of the privilege which the la 
aUO'II'I, and which he claims. It folloll'S necessari.ly then, that if the 
question be of such a description that an GnS'W'er to it E.!!l ~ ~ ~ 
criminate the witness.. accord:i.ng to the purport of that Mewer;-It must 
rest Wl'tll EImse'I1, w110 alone can tell what it Vlould be, to mlS'Wer the 
question or not. If, in such til cue, he say upon his oath that his answer 
lVOuld criminate himseU, the court can demand no otller testimny of the 
fact. If the declaration be untrue, it is in conscience and in law as mud 
a perjur,y as if he had declared any other ~mtruth upon his oath, as it is 
one of these cases in which1 the rule of law must be abandoned, or the oath of the witness be received. 9 
The courts have further held that the pri vUege exists solely for the pro-
18340 US 159 (1950). 
19~ite~ States v. Burr, In re \'lUlie, 25 Fed. Cas. 38, 40 (1307). 
13 
tection of the witness himself', and may not be claimed for the benefit of third 
20 • parties. For the pnvilege is a strict13 personal one and witness has no 
right to refuse to incriminate others. Indeed .. if the witness knows that hiS 
associates have committed a seriolw erina, the refusal to disclose that fact 
makes the witness himself guilty of the crime ot misprision of felony. The com 
mon sentiments of the American pEtCple place a high regard upon personal loyalty 
the role of inforrllBr is a repugnant one. Loyalty to onets fellows is more 
imn8diate and consequently lIDre c;)~lllng than the rem>te and r,enerilized 
loyalty due to society as a whole. But regardless of these considerations of 
private norallty and personal predilections, the government demands from its 
citizens their full cooperation in supnlying information relevant to ihe t>roper 
concerns of p,overament. It may even be necessary to testify against rrother and 
father and immediate family which ts ?Srhaps harder than testifying aeainst 
oneself', but the ,)r1v1lege does not protect them. 
As we shall see later on, one of the \?bjections against imunity statutes 
., 
is that they taU to ehield the witness from: rlisgraceahd the consequent los. 
of reputation and standing in the community. But.as a matter of fact Anerican 
Courts have alwqs denied a witness tJ18 privileee of refusing to testify to a 
material issue when his only claim has been that his answer would result in 
disgrace. The prirlCipal case on t.~e question of disgrace, Brown v. lfalker. 
fortifies Wigmore's contentil)n that there is a vast difference hetween prlvilog~ 
against dist,"l'aee and prlvUege against self-incrimination.2l In the instant 
20a0gers v. l!nited Sta~BI 340 US 367 (1951). 
2~1 tS S91 (1898). 
case, the witness fiS notsubjecu to proseoution" and only the possibility of 
disgrace remained. Her testimny was material to the issue. The court reaf-
firmed the principle .that Ii person can keep silent only when, b't.r speaking. 
criminal fiCtion against the witness can result. "When the effect of the ques-
tion would be on~ to tmVeU the witness' put indisoretions, the COt'lrt will 
not !",!rmit the witness. pride or rerutation to block the adm1nistration of 
justioe. tl22 
Possibly the best diSCUSSion against disgraoe is by Mr. Justice Field 1n 
his dissent to Brown v. Walker, where he states that the intent of the framrs 
of the Oonstitution was not alone to ~rotect a witness against self-incrimina-
tion, but at the same time to save him "in all cases from the shame and inf'UV 
of confessing disgraceful crimes, and thus preserve to him such rneasure of 
self_respect. ft23 
The broadest privilege, that of refusing to answer a question on the 
grounds of disgrace eYen though the questi?n is relative to t.he )rincipQl isswu 
of the case, was allowed in one federal. trltd, that of United state,! v. James, 
cited by Ju .. c;tice Field in his disst3ntinq oPinion. 24 This view has bund lIttle 
if any acceptance elsewhere. The major! ty and best view supports t..~e rr:tvilege 
8f;ainst d:i.sf"Taoe only llhere material issues or tile veraoity of the w1.1~ncsses 
are not in question.25 
22Thid. 
-
23Ibid• 
-
24uni.ted States v. J .. 'lIeSs 60 Fed. 2$7 (1394). 
25John iharton, Oriminal,. Evidence, llth ed., (New lork, 1935), 11ll9. 
Th~ benefit of the Fifth Atpendment was consider~bly restricted when the 
courts held t.hat the clause does not protect the cl.&imant if T)l'"osecution is 
26 hi.rred by lapse of tir.'l8, b".r statutory enactraent, or by a pl rdon. Nor can the 
federal. privilege be claimed by ~ witness in order to avoid incrir.rl.nation and 
prosecution under lit state la.27 This holding is baaed on the English rule 
that does not protect a witness ar;a.inst disclosing offenses iT. violation of the 
laws of another country. 28 Our Suprem Co·urt thus concluded that iml!luni ty 
a~ainst state prosecution is not essential to the valldi ty (;f feder.a statutes 
declaring that a vdtns£s shall not be excused from giving testimony on the 
ground that it will in.criminate him. 
Conversely, in state courts :i.t is held that lit witness must ~vestif:r under 
an i!ilQuni ty statute even though he will thereby be exposed to feder.u prosecu-
tion.29 Thic interpretation was not introduced without lit vigorous dissent from 
Justice Black who observed that "never since the Bill of R l.ghts lias adopted, 
until today, has this court, sustained .. si.ngle conviction fOl' i\ feder .. l of£enae 
\vhich rested on selt-incrinrl.natory testimo~ 'forced from the accused. I cmmot 
agree to do so now.-30 
The holding of the QreElnleaf case was qualified to some e:~tcnt in Applica-
26arown v. Walker, 161 US $91. 
27Un1ted States v. MurdOCi: 284. US l41 (19.31); Meriwether v. State, 
S S..E.2a n (l~40" t1nite3 SiR S V. !!!. Pierre, 128 '.2&. 919 (19~). 
28 ,,,.' Re,~ v.~EJ" 121 Engl. Re~~nt 730, ~.2! ~ ~ Sicilies v. t'J..llc~x, lJ~ate!rI'i'!S n.s. 10,0 (1.);,0). 
291!.! !! GreerJ.eaf.', 28 N'IS2d 20 (1941). 
30reldman v. UniteS States. 322 US 487 (1944). 
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~ .2£ I!erlnnds.. where a witness refused to answer C31'"tQin quest.bns on the 
gro1mds of possible incrimination under the laws ot New Jersey or of tho Feder 
Government, even though a statute .granted him complete .freedom from. prosecution 
in lJei\'" Y::;rk State in regard to any of the matters a'boat which he ,dght testify .. 3. 
The court stated that his contention that he was not ?rctected under the ata-
tute from possible prosecution in another jurisdictl.::m ~ns absolutely true, but 
Vlant on to s-.r th ... t a st4l.te is only required to prot.ect the witness from prose 
cutien in its own courts.. However, if' Ii witness could 2I'OVC thc;.t the danger of' 
prosecution in another jurisdiction was re&l. and substiilntial £md the CO'ltrt was 
satisfied of tl:at fact from the evidence, then ftit il: the duty of the cot<.rl. 
under such circumstances, to protect the witness from any disclosu:ro vihich 
might expose him to prosecution in the foreign jurisdiction. n32 
It should be noted that the federal rule is followed in the majority of 
jurisdictLins, lmeroin the courts trure the view that possibili ttJ of incrimina-
tion under the 1av18 of another state, ox upder federal 1avvs, is ~ a basis for 
the assertion of the privilege.)3 However in all probability, cO~Bidering the 
nature .of the present Supreme Court. 11..'1.18 1)08i tion Ydll Borm be 1iberllllized. 
We can eXl:lect a judicial declarati;)n that congressional immunity statutes are 
binding in oo""h foderal and stote jurisdiction upon the thoor-.f that~ DS L'.n act 
of Coni~' such statutes become tho st..'P1"Sme lay; of the land, lire venting state 
as\'1ell as federal prosecuticn. 
.3l,.2h NYS2d 402 (1953). 
32lbid• 
330f• 58 Am Jur 53. 
17 
If an accused takes the stand of his own initiative, then be ~ilu.st s-..hmit 
to cross-examination.3h If he fails to testit,y, unfavorable prest~~tions and 
inferences are not to be drawn other than s'.lch 3S ma.y be dravm f'r()lll his fail'Ul'e 
to expl.Rir ... incriminating fects that lie within his own peculiar knowledGe, and 
neither the judt,,;e nor the pr:>s9Cuting attorney :rr'.rty co~nt u;"on t.h,e failure of 
the accused to take t..~e E;tand and testLI'y.35 Indeed the judr;e sho"lld charge 
the jury that the f aUure of the accused to testify does not create artr pre-
s'.unption aga.inst him and is not to be \;.Sed by t."lo jury to his prejudice.36 
The Firt.~ A.:nendricnt is of co .. :rse Q lL'1Ii.tation on the federal ;;ower only" 
and has no ap,-,lication to ~roceedines under the author:tty of the state.37 
This beeause the privUeGe against selt-incrL'Ilination is not one of the funda-
nental rights of national citizenshi:), so as to be included aroong the ~jrivilegeJ 
and imunities of citizens of the iJnited States which the states are forbidden 
to ~b!'tdge by the Fo'::rteenth t:l.mendr:.:mt.38 
firmly estt.lblished than tha.t which Iii i'i'ords to a ?.:itness the ::ri-rllece of re-
.. 
35c:l:'. 5.3 Am Jur 81. 3"5. 
3623 U.S.C.A. 632. 
37~d(;r v. ~., 291 us 97. 90 A!J1. 575 (1933). 
381\;ir.d.;r: v. lJE;"W t.T6lrscll _ 2ll US 73 (1900). COP.1CH:lre State v. Height, 117 Iowa 6~, 91 • 93~S9'm 4371 holdine that the exemption is reqUIred tJy due:)xoeess cf law. See also 50 1 ... 111 Jur 44.. 
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th.e defendant or witness in ~r cri;n:i.:r..u. proceadi!;.: Co!' cid.1 tl'icl. ,\'llCrc the 
answer +.0 a question ,,-ouJ.d yield evidence vi .. cri(;l6. The ';irivUcE;O i8 s-triotl;j 
personal, for the protection of indiv"'iduals and not corporations, nor for the 
1xm&f:Lt of third pOArties. In considerinG a vd.tm::ss' clau of privilc CO against 
sel.f-incrim:i.J."lstion, the feder .. l cota'ts will not take ll:Jtice c)l t!1G c:1.'iminal lnf 
of :mother st.t.e or sovereignty. It is -the "rule in l'l.a!:vr jur:J.sdictions that the 
ciGi'end&'!!1t's i';,;,ULlre to testify ill his o~m h'er.nli' C811!' .. Ot 1,)8 t·:.ken as ~ CireUi'll-
st.ance ind.ic;;;ting tis ell.Ut, :l(,r C~:Ul t..~o pI'osecuting att,orney cc:m::iOnt il.?0n it. 
7he ~,ri"lrik ge falls find the: '"in tnel'lS ';:ust tr;;sti:'y Y.t.v.:;I'(l ;'ll"('secl'.tl,;:;r,is ":Iarred by 
lapse of tiro, tiardon, gl'~:r.t of i:"Ji,1:mi ty J etc. Finally .. t..1.e due ;;l"'OCEWG c~ause 
of the Fo~:.rte6nth A:lilEtndr.lent does not include -:::16 ri.;ht .r~ot to incrird.r:ate one-
self, and ~,o the amendment is not binding upon the statO$. HOlisver Ihost states 
have adClpted Si!rd.~2r i)l'OvisiollS in their Gvm const1tl.1.tiona.. 
CHAPTER liZ 
It wuld be well to preface this chapter with a brief consideration of 
natural law and natural rig)lt according to the philosophia ~erreni.s. 
The idea of natural. law is a heritage of Christian and classical thought. 
It goes back beyond the philosophy of the ei dtteenth century to Suarez, Thomas 
Aquinas,. Augustine, Cicero and the Stoics, and to the great nnrilists of 
antiquiV. Aristotle, Plato, and Sophocles. "Antigone is the etemal lleroine 
of natural law. which the ancients called·~ umIIId.tten law, and this is the 
nane most befitting it.ttl 
Man is possessed of • human nature. Ue is also gifted with intelligence 
by which he acts with an understanding of what he is doing. Thus he has the 
power to determine for himself the ends which he wID pursue. Howe'il.J3r since 
man has a nature, and t..ltus is fashioned in • certain determined way, he has 
certain determined ends Which correspond with this nature. 
This means that there is by very virtue ')f human nature ltan order or a 
disposition Which human reason can discover and according to wnich the human 
will must ~t in order to attune itself to the necessary ends of the human 
being. The 1llIW1'itten law. or natural law, is nothing IlDre than that.tt2 
ItaturU ]a w, then. is the partiCipation of a rational creature in the 
.-...w;,..-____ _ 
f\ 
'Ibid. 64 
-
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eternal law of God, and by means of ,vilich he is directed toward his final end. 
er in the 'beautitul figure of St., Augustine, the eternal law is the seal, and 
t.'1e natural law is its impression in the rational nature of !!lan, which in turn 
is an image of God. Thus at birth the natural law is in man only virtuall;tr .. 
By examining the nature of things with the light of his reason, man formulates 
the natural 1_ in a code of moral principles. The general principles of this 
code cannot be invincibl3' unknown by normal mature ;:)ersons, though its remote 
ooncluai:DS can be so un1alown. The first moral principle--do good and avoid 
ttThere are othelt comrron or general prinCiples based on t.he first iOOral 
principle, following from it with immediate inference, or with n8diate infer-
ence 80 Simple and eas,y that no normal mature person can fail to 11&ke it. a3 
To people of nor_l intelligence theM co:n::on principles, suoh as the tan com-
mand~nents, cannot be inv1ncib~ unknown. 
Then there are the remote conclusions, sometines called tertiar,y precepts" 
derived by a complicaW<i reasoning procesS- and enuntlated in positiw law. 
-. 
l'he88 can remain invincib~ unknown even to intelligent people. There is room 
here for error IS there is in arq science, just as there is also room for the 
e>:.pansiOll and developmnt which comes with centuries of study and application. 
"The idea of natural law, at first imn'areed in r1 tea and rrtrthology t differen-
tiated itself only slowly, as slowly even as the idea of nature.a4 
Now the idea of natural law implies the existence of such things as rights 
3Austin Fagothey. S.J •• R1et ~ Reason (St. Louis, 1953), 1$9. 
hv..r1 tain, 6h. 
2l 
and duties, f.or a large pet of the natural lanr deals with the relations of 
justice between men. .And a natural rip,ht is (;ne which man sho'.,ld enj!)y if he 
is to fulfill ~le obligation of Qchieving his tinal end, imposed upon himb,r 
the natural. law. The sane natural 1_ which l..,-s down our ;il)st tundamnt.al 
duties is the very ln which assigns to us our fundamental rights. 
The question then is to determine whether the Fifth Amendmnt is such • 
vital component of the juridical order that, without, man would find serious 
difficulty in ach1ev1ng his end. 
In the f)revious chBt"'Jter we co~leted a survey of the judicial developllBnt 
of • single clause of one a.mendment to the Con8tituti;:n, whioh states that, :ltJo 
person. •• shall be compelled in an:r criminal case to be • witness against bin;.. 
self." There are several observations that we can draw from this survey which 
will be of assistance 1n solving the lineation whether the Fifth Amendment :is a 
natural right of man. 
Certainly the Supreme Court has faile~ to tollow a consistent policy with 
• 
regard to the privilege. The efforts at first wre in the direotion of • lib-
eral construction, as evidenced by the extension of the privUege from the de-
fendant alone to witnesses, and from crimina);. cues alone to & proceeding 
whatsoever where the answer might subject the claimant to crinttnal prosecuiiion. 
An attempt to restrict rather than expand the :.lrivilege was later seen in 
'!:"lllings which permitted compulsory exhibition of the defendant's body, the 
wearing of certain clothing for the purpose of identification, medical examin .... 
tiona and foot and finger printing." In holding that the possibility of prose-
Sao1t v. United States, nB US 245 (1910). 
-
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cution in another jurisdiction does not, give rise to the ;:crivilece, the courts 
have added Q further limitation. 
The effort today is once again in the direction of liberal construction. 
Chief Justice Warren recently indioated in the Wat1d.ns case the extremes to 
Which the Supreme Court is prepared to go.6 The witness Watkins cooperated ful-
ly with the congressional invast1g~t1ng comnlittee on all questions related to 
his Olm association with the Conll11ul1ist Party. HOYiSver when questioned about 
the possible communist a££iliations of his friends" Watkins simply refused to 
answer. He was convicted cmd sentenced for contempt. On appeal to tha Supreme 
Court, the Fifth .Anendmant privileGE! was not raised u.r either party as an issue 
in the easEl, for Watkins had not claimed the privilege when questbned by the 
cor:tmittee. Iht just as if 1t Vlere an issue, Chief' Ju.stice Warren let 1,t be 
known in his 1'f1.ajority opinion that ttany challenge to Watkins' right to i.nvuke 
that priviJe ge could not have prevaj~ed betore the Supren:e Court ... 7 Here for 
t."1e first time the Court indicates t.hat the. witness oan claim the orivUege in 
v ' 
order to Shield another, whereas the settled'law lias always been that 'the privi-
lege is personal and no one can inV'Oke the constitutional rights of another. 
Saint Thomas w\~uld also take issue with the diotum of the Watldna case for he 
declared that. "It is oontrary to tidelity to make known secrets to the injU17 
of a p:1rson; but not if they be revealed for the eood of the comnnmity, which 
8 
should alW1YS be preferred to • private good." 
61 L.ed.2d 1273 (1957). 
7IbicI. 
-
23 
An:! effort to discover the rationale of the yrivUege is further hindered 
by such decisions as those which restrict the Fifth Amendment to defendants or 
witnesses in a federal Jurisdiction, and not to any citizen in arw ju.r.tsdiction 
or those decisions which exact testimol\Y' (in exchange for immunity) in a feder 
court and permit the same testiDDl\Y' to be used later to convict the claimant 
in a state court, or those whioh honor t..ll.e privilei.:e where there is d;;meer of 
prosecution but insist upon disclosure of the crime where threat of prosecution 
is non-existent because of pardon, immunity, etc. 
So as we traoe the development of the doctrine on the Fifth A..'nen<:hient we 
find that no rationale clearlY asserts itself' throughout as the raison dtetre ... I. _____
of this ourious privilege. Does it exist to protect a citizen from the roe-
volt1ng situation of (ll)ndemning himself? No, because that 1s precisely what he 
does vAlen his immunized testimo~ in the federal COl~ is introduced into the 
state courts, and as one dissent.inc: judge observed, it is small comfort to the 
witness that his abode for perhaps the next twenty years ..... ill be a state, and 
not a federal, pen.itentiaty. Perhaps it e:id;~s.ts to protect the witness' right 
to silence, to privacy, or to • good reputation? If so, these riehts have been 
shamefully abused by immu...rdty statu.tes and the like. 
One conclusion we oan reach fro!:! this survey of the leading decisions on 
the Fifth Amendnant is that the courts have not considered the }X"lvilere u one 
of the fundansntal, and therefore natur:a~ rie.hts of rnan. To co!£irm this 
judgement let us stud¥ the oases themselves and their commentaries. 
'1'0 be sure, there have been juriSts who wrote of the privilege in terms of 
a natural right. In the trial of' John Lilbu.rn the court said that "this oath 
is against the ver,y lsw of nature for nature is al~s a ?reserver of itself. 
not a destroyer. But if • man takes this wicked oath he destro s and undoes 
24 
~e1f. as dailY experience doth witness.u9 This is certainly strong language 
in favor of a natural. right interpretation, but tor good or ill, it was never 
adopted by our own courts. 
file closest that an .Anvitrican jurist has come to such a clear enunciation 
of t..l-te privilege as a natural right is the dissentin~ opinion of Mr. Justice 
Field lIben he saida tithe essential and inherent cruelty of compelling a man to 
ela;>ose his ovm guilt iEl obvious to everyone, and needs no illustration. It is 
plain to every perSOn l1ho gives the subject a moment's thought. A sense of 
personal degradation in being compelled to incri1ld.nate one's self must create a 
feeling of abhorrence in the conmunity at its attell\'lted en:t'OrMmant.tllO Mr. 
Justice Field finds that there are two grounds tor the rule against self'-
incrim:1.nation, one of policy and one 01' humanity. That of policy forbids 
placing the witness in a position where he would be under a strong temptation 
to commit perjU1"Y'J that of humanity forestalls any effort to obtain a confessior 
by- duress, "every 8pecies and description ~f which the 1_ Ibhors. ltll 
• However Mr. Juetice Field was unable to-persuade the majority of his court 
or to influence the oourse of subsequent decisions. The one cnse above all 
others which indioates beyond dispute that our Supra. Court does not consider 
the nrivilege as a basic right of the A7ooriom citizen is that of 'l'wini.tlg v. 
12 !!2! Jers!b decided in 1908 and never overruled. Since it is such an impor-
• 
9Howell, State 1'r1als, III, 1315 (1637}J see also!!::! v. United ~atefJ, 
l68 "00 532. 
lOBrown v. Walker, 161 US 591 (1898). 
llIbid. 
-12 . ¥ni~ v. !!! Jers!b 211 US 78 (1908). 
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tant and far-reaching decision, we can arrON to consider it oarefully. 
The deiendant Twining,. a director of a trust co~" was indicted by' the 
grand ju:r-~ for having knowingly exhibited a 1a1se paper to the bank examiner 
with intent to deceive him as to the condition of the compauy. At the trial 
tho .1ury was instructed by the oo'~,rt that the'J might draw an unf"vorab1e in-
ference against one of the defendants for his failure to testify in denial ot 
the evidence which tended to incrirrdnAte him. The 1_ of the state of New 
Jere6Y nerm1tted such an inference to be drawn. The defendant was convioted 
and appealed to the SUp1'enB Court where it was argued th,t the New Jersey 
statute permitting an adverse inference from the defendant's silence destroyed 
the privUege Q gainat selt-incrinli.nation. Therefore the question before the 
Court WtaS whether suoh a statute did or did not violate the Fourteenth Apmd-
Joont of the Constitution. ei tiler by abridging the 13ri v1.leges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States, or by' depriv.lng persona 01 their lives, 1:Lbert;,r. 
or property without due process of' Ift.13 :, 
The court'. decision in this case was rendered by Mr'. Justice 2k>ody who 
argued that it is mani.test from a review "of the origin, grovrth,. extent and 
limits of the exemption trom compulsory selt-incrimination in the English la, 
that it is not regarded as a part. of the law ot the land, or Magna Carta, or 
the due process ot 1., which h,. been deemed an equivalent expression, but. 
on the contrary 6 is regarded .. separate from and independent of due process. 
13A.mandrrsnt XIV •••• llo State shall make or enforce any- 1.- which shall 
~bridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United StatesJ nor shall 
~Y &tate deprive 8lV person ot lUG" liberty, or property, without due process 
~r lM. 
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It came into existence not IS an es:~ential part of due i)rocess, but as a wise 
and beneficent rule of evidence ciewloped in the oourse of judicial decision." 
After establishing the tact that the privilege originated as at rule of 
erldence, Hr. Justice Moody goes on to explore the question 'Whether the priv:.l-
lege is of such a nature t.l-tat it m.ust be :!.ncluded in the ver-j concept of jus-
tice. He asks if the privilege is a .t'undamental principle of liborty :t."ld just e 
which inheres in the very idea of a free govarm1£mt? His ansvJer is that none 
of the great instruments 'Which we are accustomed to consult for the enu.nciat1o 
of the f'1mdamantal rights o£ man made reference to it. The privile ee was not 
dreQIOOd of' tor hundreds ot years after :Magna Carta and "has no place in the 
jurisprudenoe of clvUi~ed and free countries outside t.b.e domain of the common 
1., and it. is nowhere observed Ql1xmg our own people in the search for truth 
outside the administration of the 12W. nl$ 
From this Mr. Justice lbody conCludes that the t'riv:llege does not rill 
within the historical neaning of due proce~s of 1., and asserts that it would 
• 
be going itr to rate it as an immutable princ11ple of justice which is the 1.n-
alienable 'r'}osseasion or every citizen ot a free government. QSaluta~.r as the 
prillciple rntI.1 seem to the great majori't'.r" it cannot be ranked with the right 
to hearing before cO:1demnat1on, the inmunity from arbitrary ponr not acting 
by general laws .. and the inviolability of priVilte property •••• It should. 
:nnwt, and will be rigidly' observed where it is secured by speicific constitu-
tional safeguards, but there is nothing in it which [dves it Ii swct1ty above 
~ v.!!! Jers!b 211 Tll 78. 
15Ibid _. 
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and before constitutions themaslves. ftl6 
As a final blow the Court adds. "There seems no reason whatever for strain" 
ing the :neanine of due process of In' to incl1lde t.his privilege because, 
perhaps, " 7.fIIly think it of great value. The privilege being only a useful 
rule of' law and not a • :f'und.aJrJ!lntal principle of liberty or justice' it can be 
abolished by a state at will and without infringement of the Federal Constltu-
tion.,..J.7 
'V1hat the Court has hflre held 1s that the privilege agai.nst selt-incrim:i.na-
tion is not among the fundamental riehts, privileges or immunities which the 
Fourteenth Amnclroont guarantees to every ci then of the United states. Thus 
the Court holds that this clause of the Fifth Amendment is a restriction ot 
Feder!!; sOveDeignty only, and is in no vm:r bindine upon the states. 
This reaeoro..1ng was confirmed in the Oft..q1lOted obite.r dicta of Mr. Justice 
Cardo!,:o in Palko v. Conneoticut. There he observed that. r,rhe right to trial 
... 
by ,jury and the ::i.ImmmiV .from proseci1.tion ,except as the result of an indiotment 
1!Jlq have vaJ.ue and imporl;cnce. Even so, they are not of the very essence of • 
6che~ o.t ordered libel"ty. To abolish them is not. to violate a 'principle of 
justine so root.ed in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental. I Few "WOuld be so narrmv er provinoial as to maintain 
that ill fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible without them. 
unat is trus of jury trial and indictment::; is true also, as the cases shoW" of 
the inEunity from self-incrimination. This too mieht be lost, and justice stU to 
1.6Ib1d. 
.... 
l1Ib1d. 
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J-;:;,~·I;.ioe Cardozo is one of the ::;nst respected justices to sit upon the 
Suprertl6 Court. Yet it is his be~ier that the Fifth Amndment is not a natural 
rieht 'but a :)rirllege, and l'urt.\;er"lDrc, a privilege that could be abrogated. 
And if it were abolished. "no dcnlbt there 170uld remain the need to give pro-
tection ar,ainst torture, physieue!' :-aental. Justice, however, wotLld not 
perish if the accused 1'fere subject to a duty to respond to order~v inq'IJiI"Y".-
Such ;)l"O:ni.nent. ju......uts as Hughes, nr~deis, and Stone concurred in t.'Irl.s opin1o 
as did P~borts and Black. 
I believe another proof that the co nrts hQ,tve not considered the ;')r:i.vilege 
It natural right is the f' a.ct that it :1a8 been consistently held that defendants 
in a court-.'ilI2rtial. he,ye no right to the privile!:6t despite t..he fact that they 
are citizens in the serrlde of their count17.l9 Were it • natural rigb.t it 
could In~r~ be denied them.. 
SO~I1C writers would like to base the privilege against self-incrinti.;:ultion 
" 
upon a 1.1ml t S n&tllrU right to silence, or to' privacy-, or to h:is cood repu:'Gat 
HO'1Ievcr this form of reasoning has not held up in the courtl'lnJlll, and these 
rights have not been honored at the bar. For example ill lJni~ !~ates v. 
ThOI:.'l.88" the court declared that the rule that a witness oannot be cO:t:r,Jalled to 
give self-incriminating testi:n»n.v has no 4p,llcation where prosecution wuld 
be barred by 11 stat"l..-rte of l:5.m:itaticns, pardon, or grant of immlmity.2O 
18302 lTS 319 (1937). 
19U.S.C.A. Amend. V, Self-Incrimination, n 8a.,. 1956 Pocket PUI't, 1..1.2. 
2Oti.l.9 Fed. SupP. $47 {194.3h of. U.5.0.A,. Amend. V •• Selt-Incrimination. 
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'the rights to silence. privacy and good reputation tared ba~ there as 
they did also in United States v. Orman where the court held that a witness be-
l ..... , ..... 
fore a congressional committee must re1.1' J tor protection against an undue in-
vasion ;:,f his privac:r .. upon the requirement that ti:le question be ~~rtinent to 
the matter l.mder inquiry by the eonuttee, and it the qllestion is g:>ertinent. 
::efusal to answer cannot ordinarily be justified on the ground tbat it is an 
L"'l:Vasion of privacy or that it may tend to disgrace the witness or otherwise 
rendsr him Want)us.21 The ccntrt reuoned that If the right to free speech 1e noi 
absolute but must yield to national interests justifiab~ thought to be of 
larger iIl'I9Orta..'"lce. The same is true of the rif')lt to remain silent. \';11.en legis-
lating to avert What it believes to be a threat of substantive evil to national 
22 
wolrare, Congress IYY abridge either freedoIIl.," 
In reaching this decision the court had no less authority than the United 
States Coda vihich states. "No witness is privileged to re.tuse to testl.fy to cr:! 
!'aat, or to produce any paper, respecting w;hich he shall be examined byeitber 
• 
House of Congress, or by any committee of either Bouse, upon the ground that hSJ 
testinxmy to l31lCh .fact or his production of such paper "'laY tend to disgr30e him 
or otherwise render him lnfaJlX)us.,,23 
The Orman case quoted above and the Federal Code are not so much a denial 
of the n€,,ht to privacy as a statement that "when private affairs come into 
21201 F.2d. l48 (19,3). 
22Ibid. 
-23 s U. .C.A. 11192-3. 
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conflict with the public interest, the latter, and not the ro~r, must pre-
vau. .. 
24 But there «re ciees, a minoriV to be sure .. which have reached the 
opposite concltl.Sion. In iJnited ~ates v. Crai~ tho court held that a witness 
is not bound to answer a question which may" render him. infam::> us, or ma:;,r dis-
grace him. 2$ Justice Jackson, dissenting in Harris v. United States and spealo-
ing of the Fourth A..11lendmnt, said. !tot CO,l.rae this, like each of our constltu-
ti<:mal guaranties, tl.Ut1 often afford shelter' for cri;u1nals. Bl.t-t the fc.refathers 
thought this was not too great a prios to pay for that decent fjrivaoy of home .. 
pap!trs, and effeow which is indispensable to individual dignity and selt-respe t. 
They ~ have overvalued privacy, but I Q'O not disposed to set at naught their 
commamd.,tI26 
The fact remains that the rie;hts to privacy" silence a.nd reputation have 
ha.d short shrift at the hands ot the co~·!rts. We have already seen t hat efforts 
to found the privilege upon the Fourteenth A.>nendment were struck down in 
~!.1 v. !!!! Jer8!£. As we also saw, th<! courts had ear~' QI'ld eonsisten~ 
• held that, unlike the Fourteenth Amendloont, the Federal Bill of P..ights was a 
limitat.:tnn upon the Federal Goverrment only and n:)t upon the stntea. Therefore 
the dofense 1.'1 the !wining case tried to include the FUth Anendment soong the 
prlvUeges guaranteed to .!!! oitizens by the Fourteenth Amendment. This ap-
proach fa:Ued, but another, to F"'J knowledge as ~"et untried, wh.:i.oh ,n2.€,pt ;rield 
24Applicat1on 2.! Gilchrist" 221,. NYS 210. 
2525 Fed. Cases 114. 88,3. Cf. United States v. Dioldnsol:11 25 Fed. Cases #14, 953 (1307). 
26331 US 145 (1946). 
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better results would be to baae the refusal to test1i'Y upon the First Amend.'l8nt 
guarantee ot freedom of speech and of the press. The r·J1e has become firm.'l\v 
established in the Supreme Court decisons that the riVlts of freedom of speech 
and of the press are am:.')!'.g the :t.'unda'l'llental rights and liberties protected by' 
the due process clause of the F01..1Tteenth Axoondllant from inpair'me..'1t by the 
states.
27 In Soh,seter v. United States it was held that f'reedom. of ~eech and 
freedom of the press are stl.Oh intimate elenents of liberty that 'l:.hex'6 is an 
instinctive and inst...ant revolt fro'l mt'f limitation of t~ eithor by 1,,1,'1" or 
a charge under the In.28 It has even b~en held by one court that these rights 
cannot be Inwt-.ilJ.y surrendered to another by a citizen, and cannot l.n:fully be 
, .. 
infringed, even tmnentarilyl by individuals alr:! more than b.Y the State itself. 
Ravine; tJnm applied the lirirt Am9nd.nJ.ent to all citizens by vlrtue of the 
Fourteenth A::oond.nEnt, it oOcl1d than be argued that the liberty to speak or 
wi ts inc 1UM3 the COrI'eE;pondine right to be silent or to speak on~ ,vhen one 
t.ta;1 £reel;'{ S"~eak.. and that tlucb r:i.f(.hts P~ ot the s arr.e inviolability as 
. . "30 
freedom of speeeh, and are insured l.mder t.."'e' same constitutional provisions_ 
"It would see:i1 that the liberty to remain sUent is correlative to the freedom 
. n 
to speak. If one must speak, he ca'1not be said to freely speak. ft 
This suggested argument holds then that the First Amendll1snt, t1.I'~ike the 
27!! ~ v. OreSOl'l, 299 US 356 (19.36); Powell v. Alabama,. 237 US 45. 
28251 TlS 466 (1919). 
29.Sp~ v. ~teJ !2s! Lodge, 270 Fa. 67. 
JOe!. ~1 Am Jur 1.1.09-10. 
3lAtchison, 1. & !. !- !-!- £2. v. ~ 102 P. 459. 
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Fifth Amendment, is a 11m1tation upon the sovreignty of the st,at.e:"!. as well as 
upon that of the Federal Government, for the Fourteenth Amendnent has been held 
to include the First Amendment. It is then proposed that since the rirJtt to 
sUeno., is inseparable from the rip;ht to s-peak, tt, too" is part c.t' the First 
Amandli8llt and therefore amcmg those rights guaranteed to all oi tizens by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. If this line of re1u;!oning ,.,tud prevail with the Supreme 
Court, it lIOuld have the effect of lending vast. dignity to a privilege that bas 
hitherto been regarded as l"lJre~ It rule of evidence of dubius worth, and would 
r:take it available t.o every citizen in whatever jurisdiction. 
But wh~tever course the cO',U"t )N\f take at some future date, cert.linly up 
to the present time it has not regarded the privilege &.'3 a natural ridlt. Of 
course the opinion of the COttrt .. however instructive, iB not nooessariJ,.y 
corroct., It m~ well be that the ')r1rtlege is in fact a natural right, and so 
we would do well to weigh some of the soholastio views on the matter. 
Most of the' scholastio authors a1"'$ inolined to base tlte p!'ivilege on the 
right to silence,. and of these only onal the.,Italien jur:.tstl fj~aneierl, 
cle2I'ly describes it as a natural right. Several use langu.~ 'hMch, I believe . 
can be so inteI?reted. 
Father John R., Conner,yJ S.J., Professor of l"r~l Theology at West Baden 
College, has recentl1 traced the d~velopment of thought on this point by the 
leading moralists since st. Tho'lU8$ Aquinas. Father Connery finds that looral1sti 
have alWC\Y's agreed that no one was bound to ~onf'ess a completely hidden or 
occult crime.32 This rir)lt found expressio1'} in the COmnDn law of England with 
33 
the trial at John Lilburn, where it was held that no one could be interrogated 
except b'<J indictment, and that one eo~)~d not be indicted unless there were 81-
rea<tr som evidence Broad indicating guilt.33 Thus the crime was not a hidden 
one. Once legitimatel,v introduced into the courtroom the defendant must ansnr 
truthfull..y a legitimr..e question put to him by one in authority. Bt..~ what con-
stitutes • legitimate question has been the subjeot of dispute over t.'1e centuriE ~ 
and the opinion favoring restriction of the tlU9stion ~rea has .round increasing 
By the end of' the siXteenth centu.r:r it was cOnDidered a so1i~ probable 
opinion that at least where the death sentence awaited the dei'endant l he would 
not be obliged to give a direct answer to til judge \'IhtJ questioned him abotrt his 
gull t. Several arguments were used to s1lpport this opinion, and the language 
emplo.1ed indicates that this objectionabl~ investigatian is against nature 
itseUI: "The main argu .. ·nant seemed to be that a law sho'~':1d be hUJ!l.an1y possible 
and acco~dated to human weakness; othe~, it is a useless law and serve« 
only to burden consciences. 'lhasa moralists: go on to say- thllrli vm oannot expect 
a man who knows that he would not otherwise be condemned to provide the testl-
mony necessary' for his conviction. Moral theologians also argued that no one 
should be obliged to cooperate in his own punishment. Going back to St. Thomas, 
they found thft working on this principle he allowed a criminal to evade a 
court summons. He also allowed a condemned criminal to escape from jai11f he 
oould do so without violence. These theologians saw no re8$on-~~--$_aame 
\ .J W €" L"o 
'. " '~~ 
", LC~YOIA 
33. ( 1lomll, State ;t'rials, In, 1315 1637). U'J'VER51'Y 
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principle could not be applied to Ii direot question rdgarding guil~.n34 
The ahove reasoning was even mre strildngl3' phrased by the Italian, 
FilaTlt7ieri, who elear4r il!q)l.ies tl'la"" the privilege is Ii natural rightt IIl~ature. 
whose laws are mrs ancient than the obscure and violent ordinances of legis-
lators; nature, which never contradicts itself in its dispositions, and which 
in creating the body and the mind of man, has created invariably lavs which 
oUJ!)lt to direct him} nature, which manifests its laws only by its i!1stir~ctive 
movements 1i'!1ich draw all man toward good at every lloment of their 11 ves-this 
same nature closes the !ll)uth or the guilty nan when the judge questions him 
about the t .. "Uth of the acousation brol:lght agail'lBt him. tt35 
For the defendant is faced with this dilemmlU the adm:i.ssion of Guilt w:tll 
entail either 'the 10S8 of. 111'e or at least a part of the good. nIt t;~erefore 
demands either an ef'f'ort superior to the contrary natural impulse, or a.n illu-
sion Which sees in the loss of' one (')f these two things the aequisiticn of t.l mum 
nora preciolls good. In the one case the l~gislator demands. • .what is lIDr~ 
~sSible; in the second case, he accepts •. -•• the st.atement of an :insane 
person, of a man wi'lO ls in the same menta.l condition as a Suicide, who cuts 
himself" off from life with his own hands because he believes that thro·,lgh the 
loso o:f' existence, he ":ill find , source of hap;>ineas or reach the end of his 
woes.,,36 
34corn1err, 132-) • 
.35rlet/f Problems in Medical. EthiCS, ad. 'Peter Flood.. O.S.B., (7~"'land, 1955 ,. 
n.lla=9.' -
36Ibid. 119. 
-
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Thus Filangieri concludes that the law is obliged to a ttaoh no signifioan 
to the admissions of the accused, for a co~l.etel;r 'Il8eless te5t1l!D~ is one 
which is kno1m to be falsified by nature itself. New York State has recen~ 
followed the same course declaring that no man can be oOnvicted on his own 
oonfession alone.37 
The right to sUenoe was based by FUangieri upon the usel.essness of the 
ooerced testitoorv. other writers base the right upon the inviolability of the 
personal secret. They argue that ever,y individual possesses a private and 
wholly personal domain, and apart !'rom definite cases provided by In, he has 
the right to rejeot arq atte~t to infringe upon it. 
The uselessness argument of Filangieri considers O"l~ the case in whioh 
the defendant is questioned about his guilt, overlooking the rrru.ch more oomnnn 
situation in which the acoused is questioned on the material details which will 
serve as pointers, perhaps against hinself', but whieh smce they are essenti 
verifiable, will allow the judge to establ+sh a conviotion nth greater pre-
• 
eision. "It cannot, theI'Cili'ore, be repeated.-too often. • • that the oonfessioa 
of the accuaed 1.s neither an element of conviction nor an eleDBnt ot pt'l."')of "hi 
can be cleciSive in • criminal case ..... But real questioning of the aoeused 
is a different matter. Ita object is to search for objective elements of in-
formation, and in this form it is both necessary and legiti:mate.,,38 
A current and celebrated murder is • case in point. Three years ago • 
Dr. Samuel. Sheppard was tried and convicted of the murder of his idfe. He 
31Pe?ple. v. Roach, 215 N.Y. 59~J the same 16 true in nllnois, Bart:!!l 
T. Peop!i, 358 DOL 5r7J People v. "lasser, WX" Ill. 265. 
38nood,.. 120. 
never ceased to protest his innocence. Three years Ja tel' a young telon in 
Florida created Q sensation by asserting that he was the murderer of Marilyn 
Sheppard. His mre confession, however, was wot-thless; it was his replieD to 
detailed and efwentially verifiable questions that betrayed his innocence or 
g1.liltl what type ot vreapon? How n't8l\V blows? How did you dispose of the club 
and the 0100<1:1'" clothes?39 
The other baE.:is often used to defend the right to silence, in t.i.e claim of 
a li13!l to his oa(;rete. This, too, Vie Il'J.St reject 'because it does not prove 
enoU€')1, it does not. l)rove ~ h<l is entitled to his secrets. 
It is 11\1 .:n'fll belle! that the ll)!st cogent argument that can be made for the 
natural rit~t theory is to be found in the conclusions that can be dran from 
the traditional teaching on datl'aetion and the risht to one's p;ood reputation. 
Detraction is the injurious attack upon the reputation of another through 
t.he unjust revelation of his hidden crin»9 or detect. It differs f1'OM cal1.ll1lJT 
in that vmat is sdd is actually true. De~etion is al"q8 a sin. rortalor 
venial d~Emding upon the gr;v1ty of' the _tter revealed., It is Q" sin beoause 
it weak--en.8 or destroys anot..~er's eood reputation, without which he will find 
it unduly difficult, if not ~ss1bl.e, to obtain the end :);f his existence. 
Not only 15 a third party precluded from revealing the hidden sins ad 
crimes of another. but as tar as the natural 1_ is concerned, ltllJ)ralists have 
had trod:lle even establishing the liceity or sel1'-defamation.1t40 A fortiort 
- - ......................... 
July 20, 1957, 1. 
S.J., ~rall t'tJ and the Fifth All'Isndnmt_" The Catholic 
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the m1.scrG2l1t has the right, if not the duty, t.o I'9nw.in silent. ThAt this is 
a natural riGht seems to tollow .from the flmOtlon of, a good reputation. 
God created man to acquire a certain .fixed end which he will aohieve by 
leading hio life according to the Divine Will as made Im01lll to M,m by reason 
and revelation. Thus he has It r undamntal right to his life and whatever else 
is necessary to live that ille accordin~ to its proper nature. A,"ld since man 
is a gregarious being" he has an inalienable right to .. mataver is required to 
live an ordinary social life. Bnt a good reputation is an elemnt at least 
morally necessary tor such a lite, and so man has a na1ntral right to his good 
naroo" as well as the right to refrain from revealinp, whatever 'Would weaken 
thtt good name .. 41 
Thj.s ref'Bon1ng seems rair~ defensible and certainly explains why detrac-
tion is wrong and wIv the malefactor has no ::!uty to accuse hi:~lSeU" "f his cr1ne 
But "rl.ll this defense hold against an :tnvest1gation launched by the State? Doe: 
a criminal stand in the same relatlon to ~ State as an innocent man whose 
• 
rir,hts are unimpaired? If so how does this ,ttitude of silence square with 
the traditional mral teaoh1ng that the defendant must respond to a legitimate 
question asked by one in authorityl And how does it squarn with a recent 
allocution of Pius IlIon the problem of punishment?42 fhis problem hae itc 
beginning at the IlX>1nmt when a man becorr..es a criminal and is a reaction, re-
quired by law and justice. to the crime. The violated social order must r.>8 
restored and it is the task of law and ,justice to re-establish the :::)l"oper har-
4lJ• J • Farraher, S.J •• P,etract.!g, !!. ~ ~ Famam (Rom, 1952), 16 
~pe Pius XII.. "Discourse to the Catholic Jurists of Italy .. tt Catholic 
pocumenta, XVII, April.. 19". .. .. 
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ttPun1shmel1t p~"Oper'l¥ so-ca~"Led oannot, therefore, have any other l~ 
'!ihe law who has yt::i.thJran fl"Om it. This order of duty is neoessarUy an ex-
presd .. on of ·;Jle order of being, of the order or the true and the p;ood, i7h:ich 
;:llono has the rieht of existenoe, in opposition to error and evil, which stand 
for that which STu ~'.ld not erist. ,,43 
The error ':"'''1d \:"i1 of which ~:Lie Pius is spe .. king here is the unpun:1.shed 
s·tate :'d:' the crlmimu, " state whIch docs not automatioal.J¥ cease "~B 11 t.he aot 
itsel.t' is co:i1p1e~d. "He remains tho ~:lP.n 'imo has oonsoio'.lSly and del.1.herate~ 
violated. it Ilt'ti which binds him, ane 8:'i.nnJltnIleo'llsly he is involved in tho pen-
alty. This pETsonal condition enmtres, ;)oth in his relation to -the authority 
0':1 which he oo;;)E)llds, or better" the human authority of public law in so far ., 
this has a share in the correspondinr; penal prooess .. and at a'~ t:tlOOS also, in 
his relation to the sllpreme dh"1ne allt..horit-y. 'l'husthere io brouGht about an 
" 
enduring cC~ldition of ~uiJ..t and punishment vdttch ir.dicatce a def:1nite state of 
the ;:;tlilty party in the e:/es of the authority offended, and elf this authority 
wi.th rea,ect to the gnilty party.nL.4 
Our IIol,y Fathar concludes with the stf.lte~nt that "the culprit's ''1Vffi good, 
per;~,a?s e~J'en ::;ore so that of the C0ID!11ID1ty, demands that thd 2.Uing ;oori:.)cr be-
c(ne sound Qr:tin •••• Deliverance from gu:ut must therefore rein"~t:rate the 
39 
relations disturbed by the culpable aet. ft45 
It seems clear from the foreg\"d,uG that 0:1.1' Pontiff considers the uIlpun1ahe 
st~te ;)f the crim..Ll'uil as Q blizht upon tho social order I that .i..t. ~U1S no right 
to its exi.stence, and that the disrupted balance mtlst be restored. The r;:ey 
aga:i.n. ft If this is so, how can ym speak of a crimi..."1&!l's righ'l.i, 11..4.s natu.l"al 
rlr::ht to sUencG,. or of t..b.e rleht to defend his obnorlo1..ls state ovan ti1('1-:.gh 
COtmter to his own good and that cf the cor:nnunity1 
We can aSSUt"ile here that the Holy Father is not spea~d.ng of a cOrl!::)letely' 
hidden Crill'e, 1)ut of o~ which t.:'1a State has knowledge. For in a completely 
unknown crime, the State as such suffers no inj1.l17. There may also be room for 
that other distinction betvmen eapital?un.ishment and incarcer::rt.1on for a 
per5.od of years .. thus saving the l'?olldJ;l' :c)l"f)hahle opir.ion "tb.st at le;,~t uhere 
the deat.h sentence awaited the defendant 1'".16 vrould not be c,bllged to G:iv~ n 
direct answer to It judge who questioned him about hi:':' [~uil t •• 46 With these 
Q:\'Cc]::rtions I think it is clear that the )1.i.screantts right to his r9?UtatiOll is 
a linrlted one and yields to the higher :':'ight of the State to seek evidence 
"Vihieh will assist i'~ in the proper pursuit of its duty--the maintenance of 
justioe and order. 
Anot.h.ar argument that the privile,::,e a.gai.llst self-:l.nerimination is not a 
natural ri.ght is dr:rwn from a rapid, and b:r no means exhaustive, reviErn' or 
other jurisdictions where the oi.rili?jation and culture are as advanced QS our 
-,-------_ ...... _,--
46conner.r, BThe Right to Silence," 132. 
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own. 1\1'01."'$ the pr1vllege a natural riGht y,"e would E!jtpect to find it at least 
amng tJ1e m!'e ellllgh-OO.nod codes '0; criminal procedure. Holrovor the privilege 
fI11GS nov",r f:aine1 i'a~tor on the European continent, not even a.."1t>rl;:' those COUll-
tries which prido thdlWalves on their de:mcratic and liberal proclivities. It 
has r.over been allowed to Dec"me a part of theil" jurisprudence or C0').rt pro-
cedures. To the peoples 'Of those nations, the notion -Ghat the principal char-
acter in Do cl"'im:bt;l iTl\"'estigation shou.ld be permitted to remm.n entirely mute 
ing th.fl solution '01 to\ crime, an effort 'Vrl1ich rrequent~ proves futile, seelDS 
highly il1og1ciaJ.., 41 Yet despite the denial in thes0 lands of this basic right, 
as 1m chD'Ose to call it" whD will say tJ.'1at the systems of justice prsYn:tl1ng 1I'l 
Fl'/.Ulce, Iioll:md, Sweden .. or West C'i:~rl'l<'1ny ;:U'f~ inferior to curs, 'Or ~. less fair, 
just, or humatlo?,thB 
The Code JllE, H.man is r-egarded as one 'Of the greatest acr.ievcments in l11s-
tory, whiJ..e the law it cc,difiad WQE i'lnd r e~:!.ns 'the glory of tJle ltoMan people • 
• lIst according to RorJ;Qn 1.,,, a judge was allcrwed to PLtt a direct qllestion to a 
defendant regarding guilt 'whenever (l) he was tmder inf'UW tor the crir::e, 
or (2) when t..1Jere .. ras clear evidence, or (3) 'when • sem1.-o(J~lete ?roo.f could 
41uIt. oho:l.d be observed however, t..~at while European ;;iToceclure ')el .. m:tts 
lind stresses the judicial examinat10n of the acoused, he is under no legal 
co~u1s1on to tmm101'." Selected t'r::. tings on the Lm of Evidence and Trial~ 
ed. wUUam f .. fryer (s!£. Pill!, !9s1), ~lt' -sGIIsO'J::lI'Osoow, I!he &ftJ.op-
mont of Present-D~ Criminal Procedu:r.es in Europe and !merica, It llal"'VClrd Law 
ftev:tew. XLVIII, 433, Hogg, ttrnmch Crlmtnal Procec1ure,,·' Canada !!f ~
~ . .l.u. (19h5), tl4b. 
4~ichard C .. Baker, "Sel.f-Inc1":i.:n1nationf Is the Mvilege an .in(1chronism?tt 
.!::!.r~ .!!t .,.sociatlop 1oUl'!!!t mI, 634. 
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be br::: "v-~; against the defendant.49 The privilece against salf-i."lcri.r:ti.nation 
is conspicuous by' its absence from this ond other codes .. 
Vi:tth regard to Oanon Law, the noted constitutionalist Edrtin COI'W'ln writes. 
"l am. assured by Father Louis Motry of the Catholic University, vIho is a recog-
nized authori~ in the field, that no text of canon law contai. ns the l"""ol~ds of 
--
the maxim and this assurance is conti~d by • careful examination of Gravinats 
Institlltiones CanonS.Ne; Pithouts Corpus Jur'i:! Canonic!, and Cmcets !:! £2S!. ~ 
~it Cmonique. • • _ The Canon Law has always reoognized the general 9r1noi.-
iPle that a man shoul.d not be requl.:red to accuse himself !!: ~ first instance,. 
att.enuated by the qualifioation that one accused by It sutticientl¥ authenticated 
~r could be legitimately required to clear his roputation or have the eharp 
rtaken as COnfessed.,1t!70 
In recent times the AlIerican Hierarchy submitted to IJNESCO a "Declaration 
Iof H~ Rights.nS'l This document emurerates the basic rights of 'the indiv.idu-
al, the fam.i.ly.. the State.. and the conttmmi tr of States. Inc.1.u.ded are the rights 
• 
to vrorlr.., collective bargaining., just w8!?,eJ bttt nothing is said of Q r:4~ht not to 
$2 
incriminate oneself, although eighteen rights of the h1l:'lml porson are coi'1ned. 
Since we h~ now established, or hope we have., that the privUe:\e is not 
a natural riP-Jlt, hnw then did it come into being? For tho answer 1re rlust pic-
49S.T .. II-n, q. 69, .. 2. 
~dwin B. Corwin, "The Supr<:H;e Court Construction of t:i6 Self'-IncriIninatio: 
Clause, tt Mic¥:sam 1!!! Hen_" XXXIX (NoveIlber .. 1930),. 3. 
;)lA.merican Hierarchy, "Declaration of HUlI'.I8n Rights,· ~e Catholic ~ 
XLV (April, 1947), 193. 
5211'01" an interesting comparison~ cf'. United Nations, "Universal BUl of 
Human. Uibhts,." .!!. !_ Bulletin,. VI .. o. 
ture u.,u .;k;.L.VeS at a crlrninal trial. Th" defendant is being :ilsked some em-
barrassing questions about a recent theft. To the oonsternation oJ: all he 
refuses to reply' even thoU€'ll he has been warned that he must answer. A dead-
lock (,nsues. Prosecu.tion knollS that the defendant (or vdtness as the case 1llIV 
be) is hiding som pertinent inform.Qtion vital to the trial.. At this ~)oint 
the !l!'Osecutor probab~ surrenders to the overpowering urge to extract a con-
fession, and lacking the Injro subtle OOTl!l:loS of today, he llright have resort 
instead to the equally effective rack or 1m-Jut. Now it was ~}reciSe~r to pre-
vent this sort. of thing that the privllege was introduced, ~ L?Jatter of ~.lUblle 
pollcy £ormuJ.ated 'b7 an enlightened social conscience -much began to denounce 
and decry such methods. But it did not 1mpl3' 1l%\V implicit recognition of the 
defendant's natural right to sUenos. It was rather an er.tl.if)ltened rule of 
procedure designed to conilat the e:ct.rems of the dIl:!, but of consj.dal"ab~ less 
value in our own tiloos 'When t."1.e dan[;er::>f torture is so l"elOOte • 
. , . 
Sidney Hook, Professor ot PhilosoMr at ColUDbia University'. recent~ 
'1 
stated that he knows of no one who urges the abrogation of the ruth A!lltnldlEnt.~ 
'th1a is rather surprising, tor Emm a cursory check on legal articles written 
on the subject reveala a deep and sooldering opposition to the A'n.8l1dnant amidBt 
the legal. profession. This opposition, at least in its 1!X)re virulent torm, 
dates .from. the time ot Bentham, and evidence of its yet vigorous 11fe can be 
found in the latest issue of the ... Am.;.;,.;,o;;.rlc.;;;.;.;;an_ !!! Asaociatiop Jo~ 
ltv purpose here is to ventilate the controversy in an effort to reach an 
intelligent, inf'orz.d conclusion as to the merits of the Amendm&nt and itD 
suitabil.1 1#7 in mdera America. 
-' 
Opposition to the priv1lege is often tr.-d in the torm o:t a dUenna. if 
the :}rivil.ege is for the benefit of the innocent, ~ do they need it? Or if' 
tor the benefit of the guiltT, ~ do they' desel!'V9 it? What is the poj.nt of 
letting them ~e this privilege if they are indeed gu1J:~? This does 
present a 'll"Oblem, tor it the guilty do not deserv-e the privilege, and the 
innocent do not need it, then what is it doing in the Constitution at all? 
i . 
. I 
This is a difficult question a.Yld one which fOl'Cl3s us to reappraise the rea 
function of the .Amen.drnent. By going to the cases we discover that its purpose 
is "to protect the innooent members of society' at large from :mcalled tor in-
vasions of privacy which lIIOuld attend the use of indiscriminate pEtriod:1c in-
quisitions by the prosecutor as a maans of discovering 'Whether crinDs migh:t 
have been conmdtted. ..... .A. second stbsid1ary purpose of the privilege ••• is 
the protection of the innocent from. the coercive measures of the O"V9r-Zealoua 
pollee officer. It ervery man has his ;1rice, so every man has his breaking 
point, the point where it is easier to eive the interrogator the answer he 
seeka than to insist upon the truth.lf2 
Clearly,then, this constitutional privilege grol'lS out of the high regard 
or our jurisprudence for conducting crinriDal trials and investigatory pro-
ceed1:ng. upon a plane at dignity, hUl'lll1'11ty,. and impartiality'. It is designed 
to prevent the use of legal. process to force from the lips of the accused the 
evidence necessar;r to convict him, or to f~rce him to produce and authentiCate 
'. an:r personal doC'W18nt.a or effects that might·, incrim1nate him. PIwsical torture 
or ather less violent but equally reprehensible nDdes ;>f cont>elling the pr0-
duction of incrim1nating evidence are thereby' avoided. "The imediate m:td 
potential e'V'll.a of oompulsory self-disolosure transcend a:s:r:r dif:f'icu1tias that 
the exel"Cise of the pr1v1lege m.1W impose on society in the detection and prose-
cution of crilne. ihUe the privilege is subject to aiJuse Qtld misuse, it 1s 
t:i.rmly enbedded in our constitutional and ~ gal frameworks as a bulwark against 
the iniquitous methods of prosecution. It proteots the individual from ., 
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disc1osure~ in the form of oral testimolV~ docwoonts, or chattels sought by' 
legal process against him as a witness.-3 
I.ord Caman, in 1765, stated the phllosoplxr behind the nrivilege we later 
embod1&d in our 'Uth Amndment in these vor&u "It is very certain that the 
law obl1geth no man to accuse himseltJ because the necessary n88M of compel-
ling self-accu;s-ation, falling upon the in..l1Ocent as well as the guUty, would 
be both cruel and unjust. "4 
A simtlar at+~tude haa been adopted by the American courts where the 
privilege has been described as "tllle of the g,reat landmarks L'"l man's struggle 
to make h1mselt ci~ It is the handmaid of the abolition of torture, and 
has its roots deep in tweltth eent1.ll7 legal thinld.ng. Its fundamental. thesis 
is that you can.'"lot extract evidence from. one charged \rl th a crime on 'Which to 
convict him. It is contrary to every prinolple of legal philoso~ to coerce 
one to reveal M.s guilt.ItS 
Bernard ~ltzer~ writing in the Uni·.rel1l::t.ty of Chicago Law Review, defends 
• 
the Amendment upon different grounds, for he believes that "the privilege at 
the trial st4tge today is not the hulwark of the innocent, not the barrier 
against torture, and not the spur. of the pollee. It is the reflection of the 
lavr's unwillingness to command the ~ssible, of its l"spect for the In of 
seJ.r""Preservation invoked by L1lhurn. It is also perhaps a renectlon of a 
humane attitude Tlh1ch 1I1IITeS ewn the guilV from a harsh choice IIIDng perjury. 
lumted state! v. 1hite, 322 US 694, 152.ItR 1202 (1943) 
~tick v. Carr~on. Howell, ~tate Trials, XIX" 1029. 
~;t!ton v. state. 75 So.2d. 2ll. 
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reoalcitrance, or confession..6 
A lJk)re practical approach has been taken by S1r John '. Stephen who ob-
served that those in old England who found themselves faced with the "ex 
-
officio' oath denounced it as contrary to the law of God and the 1_ of nature, , 
while they considered the maim ".!!.t!? tenet!ll" aeiew! P1"2S!!!- to be in accord 
wlth both t."le las of God and nature. ttThe real truth,- SU Stephen asserts. 
"Was that tho .. who disliked the oath had u.suall.y done the things oflflich they 
ware accused. It 1 Although Sir stephen thus finds the privill ge highl;r adv~ 
tageous to the guilty', be 'WOuld retain it as contributing great,'4r to the dig-
nity and apparent humanity of a criminal trial. U1a mst coq>elling argument. 
however. is reached after • at. of sewn trials, foUl" English and three 
French. In FNnch oourts the defendant oould be questioned, in the English he 
could not. Sir stephen found that "in every one of the English cases the 
evidence is fulJ.er, olearer, and inf1niteq IlDrG cogent than it is in any one 
of the French oases, notwithstanding which ~ar 1$88 time was occupied by the 
• English trials than by the Fremoh ones, and not a word was said or a step t4.ken 
whioh ll\V'one can represent. U o1"1J81 or undignit1e4,8 One wonders, though, 
.,mather seven cues is • fair sarq:>l.:i.ng and whether all other factors had been 
elinttnated. 
a,ving upon lOOre :mdem times we find that the New York Constitutional 
~onvention Colmlli ttee,. after uldng • thorough atuC\v of the privilege, drew up 
6aernard Jleltur,. "Required Records, the ~arron Act, and thtIJ Privilege 
~ainst Self .... Incrimination.tI? Univ. of Chicaco ~ Revie.!f". XIX, 687. 
1 John F. Stephen.. !l1sto,!Z .2! ~ Crim1n~ Law. as quoted in Wiglmre,. 3l3. 
albic:!. 
-
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• comprehensive list of ita advantages. 
(1) One purpose of' organized societ:'r is to secure to each ci'~izen his 
right to privacy. The constitutional clause inhibiting self-incr1m:l.nltory 
testi1lV)~ is directed to this end. 
(2) The existenoe of the privUege cOl".ters upon the criminal trial-and 
tor that matter, upon fJ!81"1' investigatory proceeding-an aspect of dig-
nity, h1llllaniW, and ifl\Jartilll1ty which the contrasted inqu:tsitoI'ial. 
process 18 too apt to lack •••• It is agreed with Hallam that the prin. 
lege is a "generous maxim" of our law. generous to t.~e 'Witness and to 
the accused. 
(3) The priv:Uege also serves as a discipl.i.rlary measure d1rected against 
the legislature and legislative 1rrvestigatory commissions. Since ••• it 
is • barrier betwen the individual whose selt-incriminatory testimttr is 
sought and the power of the government to ob:bain his testinDIW, it pre-
cludes the cOMtitutionality ot Q!\V' 1_ which attempts to authorize 1q' 
type of discovery proceeding without also providing an inmuni V or am-
nesty to the test1t.ring witness. Therefore antecedent to the adoption ot 
any such 1ft) there aJ.wlo\V8 is required a balancing of interests-whether 
the benefits to be obtained by procuring the testimn;y of criminals wouJ.d 
be greater or less then the evils which would follow from exempting them 
forever :£rom proseoution for the crimes disclosed by their testinnru. 
Thua the people va spared ill-considered legislation purporting to 
authorise ECqJeditionary proceedings and investigations that un be in-
stituted tor no other purpose than to appease grouPs, satisi"y curiosity" 
or harass the unpopular. 
(4) !he privilege serves to stimulate ~?roeecuting officers to an inde-
pendent search tor evidence •••• In tbe absenoe of the privileee, 
prosecuting attorneys might, not unnaturally .. re:i¥ on the opportnnity to 
obtain the defendmtfs testinDl\Y at the trial; they might, simillilr~·, 
abate their s.arch for independent evidence J there is thus good reason to 
tear that the prosecution would try to prove its case sole J;r through the 
accused., An ofticer in India once expressed this tendency on the part of 
prosecuting officers as followst 'It is far pleasanter to sit comrortabl\v I I 
in the shade rubbing red pepperin~ the poor devilla eyes than to go 
about in the sun hunting evidence." 
In proof that this danger of coll¥>ulsion is scarce~ less real today than 
~ colonial Ind1. the reader is referred to the famus and shocking case of a 
Pew years ago wherein the defendantfs home had been raided without werr;.mt, and 
~rt of th4 L_ Revision COIllDi8slon, State of New York (New York, 1942) 
~77-8. --- Ii 
~O protect h:tmeeli' he nal101ftld several capsUles of dope that were on his bed-
~t,and. The oapsules 'Were later extraoted by a st::lmach pump and used in evidence 
~ainat the defendant. Speaking for the oourt, Justioe Frankf'urter declared, 
!tIt is conduct that shooks the oonsoience. nlegaJ.ly breakine into the pr-ivacy 
)! the petitioner, the struggle to o'gen r.is r.Duth and remove what was there .. the 
~orcible ext.raotion of his stomach's contents-this course of proceeding by 
~ents of gsvemment to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensi-
~ilit1.e8. They are lOOthods too olose to the raok an.d the screw to permit of 
onstltutional differentiation •••• Nothing cOlJld be more oalcu1ated to dis-
redit law and thereby brutalize the ten;>er of a society.ttlO 
Thus far we haw oonsidered abot.."t as strong a defense of the privilege as 
can be round ~ere. It is now tL~ to hear the adVocates of abolition. the 
foreQ)st of -mom is Jeremy Bentham, the great legDJ. and sooial reformer of 
another centu.ry.. His opinion takss on great signifioance ll'lEm Tre re~kllie that 
nearly tNeT"J reform which he ohampioned for ~-the law of evidence came jio pass 
., 
within three generations. "We might alJ~nst regard his eonderltnation of an:; rule 
as presumptive evid~nce of its ultitmte downfall. ell 
Aquinas-like .. Bentham net up the best defense of the pI'ivi]ege that he 
cc.)lcl, and then proceeded tiC demo~ish it with his ridicule and reason. The 
first was "the C)ld mJ!'l.3ll's reason,," which could be smll"led up in the one word 
"hard." It is Ithardlt upon 8, man to be obUged to iner1mi.nate himself. So 
too is punishmant, observes Bentham,. 'tlut no one has S Ut,,;gested ~ as a suf' .... 
10n0ch~ v. f'eoele 2! California, 72 Sup. Ct. 205 (1952). 
u.vigunre., 3Oh. 
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£1c1ent reason for destroying pruOl1s. 
'the second defenae 1s the ftfoXr-hunter's reason, It 'Which feels that the 1_ 
should be at least as handicapped _ the hounds. That the defendant should be 
giVen a sporting chance in the sam sense as in a contest is patently absurd 
and sure~ must find little support beyond the limited circle of anti-
vivisectionists. 
The third defense, and the last with which 'We will be concerned, is 
iavored by those 'Who confound interrogation 'With torture. Bentham d.ecla res 
that "the act of putting a question to a person whoee station is that of defe 
dant in a cause, is no nDl'e an act of torture than the putting t~e same ques-
tion to him 'WOuld be if instead of being a defendant, he were an extraneous 
witness. ihatever he chooses to slq, he is at full liberty to say • .,12 
This contusion of interrogation with torture is cOJWuon even today. Dean 
Griswold in\>lies in his little book that wi tho 1.1t the ruth .A:mi.mdm.~ nt l'le wo u1.d 
be exposed to the pol1ce methods of the to~lltar1an state.l3 "If we are not 
• ~ to 19 t the .-ndment be i.nvoked" where over ti_ are ... going to stop 
when police and prosecutors or chairman want to get people to talkZtf14 
Does the Dean rea~ think that this privilege is the only" defense lett to 
the defendant aga1nst the unbridled power of the State? If so. '&hat happens 
those instances where the defendant is held to have waived his privilege 
against the Fifth Ame~nt? Is he now tortured, herrasaed and badgered? 
• 
12Jerellff Bentham,. !ationale .2! Judicial F,videnc~ (London, 1821), V, Bk. 
IX. Part IV, Chap. III, ~29. . . ' 
l3srnest Griswol~ !h! Fifth AlOOndment Tec!!l (Cani1ridge, 1950). 
l4oriswold .. !!!!. Fifth Amandl!ent T0!!!l, as quoted by Hook, 58. 
Certainly not; nor would he have been had the privilege never been his in the 
first plaoe. For under our present system of trial procedure in an orderly 
courtroom, with defense counsel always prssant, the danger of torture is td.mpl;y' 
so remote that it can be utterly discounted. Therefore to link tortu:re w1th 
interrogation is to introduce an anachronism which will gain 11 ttle credence 
among the sober-minded. 
Professor Viigmre made a nice distinction in his rep1-,v to the above argu-
r.entB of Bentham.. He pointed out that Bentham had failed to distinguish be-
tween interrogation 'Of an individual betore tndietnent, and the questioning ot 
an accused ,!f'ter indictment. WiglOOl"e seems to agree that the privilege is not 
So essential in the ]a tter case but certainly is in the formr. Questioning 
without ind:totnent was the t"'!-,use that first gave birth to the ortvUer;e, for it 
sign! ties an examination on mere suspiCion without prior presentment or other 
formal accusation. 
It is Professor Wigmore's fear that s~h a system is certain to be abused. 
" 
In confirmation of this he rllight have referred to a fairly recent book on 
Constitutional La. Its author found that "the privilege does not protect 
against third-der,r&e coercion. Third-degree torture is one of the disgraces 
ot the United Statu. It takea many- ditferettt toraH fk)l1l!ti"!l8s it consists ot 
threats ••• solitary contineutent ••• whipping or the use of boxing gloves ••• 
rubher hose. • • water cure, etc. If there i8 anythi.."1g that the ~ ccused ought 
to be protected against it is third-degree oompul.sion as practiced by the 
police of the United States. Yet the :)rivilege against selt-incrimination will 
not avail a poor victim in the hands or the police. A technical reason given 
is that the protection 1s waUa"a onl,y in • criminal prosecution and that at 
the time third-degree practices occur there is not yet any oriminal prosecu-
tion • .JS 
Since such practices can nourish now with the Fifth Amendment, so too 
they could and would without the Fifth Alnendment. But in both cases outside 
the courtrrom,. The solution then lies not 1.n the Fifth Amendment, but in 
those steps which will utterly eaclude forced testinnny from the courtro01'l1t tIl 
eUminating all incentive for the use of third-degree methods. 
Bentham found the privilege unneoessrary and an impeclil:nent to justice at 
the trial stage, 80 he sought to eliminate it tram ~ the trial and the pre-
trial stages. Professor Wigmore found the privilege absolutely' essential at 
the pre-trial (pre-1nd:tctment) sta~, implied that it wasnot too i~rtant at 
the t1'1.a1 ataeo and yet concluded that it should be rettined in both. Did 
neither perceive the possiblity of retaining the prlviJe ge at the pr&-trial 
sta!!,o so t hat no one Q) uld be questioned without indlctlllmtJ but once the State 
had shown sufficient causa for i."dictmant, ~ then the accllsed 'WO uld be question 
at his trial, under the orderly sur>erv1sion ()! the judger? 
The A~rlcan Law'Institute in its Model ~ 2! _Ev:! ...... _den __... ce_ .• seellV3 to support 
this view, fo!" there it is uidt "If we assume the continuance of trio1 by an 
i~artial j11'rj"" before • competent :fudgs in publiC, it 1.s dif'ficult to under-
stand how an accused represented l:1jr co~etent cC;ll1sel can be 11nfair~v'treated 
by being required to testtiY. He may need protection against })Olice and 
prosecutor but he can ~ need 'Orotectior. against judge and jury vdlose 
l~. E. Willls, Constitutional Law of the United st.tes (Bloomington, 
1936), 52J.. ' - - - , , 
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action is subject to review by an appellate court.,.l..6 
Professor Wigz!ore finds another fatal and fundamental error in Bentham's 
positiont "Any s,rstem of adminstration which permits ~~e prosecution to trust 
habitually to co~uJ.sor,v self-disclosllre as a l"lO'JI'Ce of proof 7:ID.3t itself sutfe 
mr:a1l,v thereby. • • • The ~le a.nd ~ef!ll process of q uestioni.ng breeds a 
readiness to r eBort to bullying and to physical forae and torture.. • • Thus 
the legitimate use grows into the 'tmjust abuse. For the sake then, not of the 
guilty but of the innocent acoused and of conservative and healthy principles 
of judicial conduct, the privilege shouldb e preserved.Hl7 
Wignnre admits that the defendant 1s the r.~~~t fertUe s,)urce of. informa-
tion, but insists that if we quiz' him under oath our system of justioe vdll 
decay .and crumble. As the professor oonfesses elaewhere, his RrgUJl'lSnt is 
e~irio, and therefore open toibe fallacy of mistaking _ mere aooidenta.l 
association for a c~. And I th:tnk that that is just what he has done, for I 
see no necessary connection between compulsor,v self-disclosure and the decay of 
the administration of justice. It seems safe· to say that interro:;ation .alone 
would result in conviction in only a mir.ority of cases, which leaves the 
department plenty of room for legwork to keep up its roral fibre. 
After all. i.£ the evidence of the defendant alon3 is suffiCient to convict 
him, why sho,;ld the prosecuting attornsy be sent scurrying aoo1,.>t seekine 
additional evidence. With a ~ wave engulfing the countl"".f, we would do well 
to do all we can to expedite trials rather than impede them. 1hreover the 
16 
American La Institute, ~del.E2.2!..2! Evidence (Philadelphia, 1942), 130. 
17wigzoore, .308. 
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proseont:1nff attorney can never be sure just what information he will be able 
to extract .from the defendant, and so he cannot attord to gamble the success 
of his case and his reputation on this one source of iJ'l.formation, if others are 
also avai1alrle to him. 
A nrofesoor of law at Chicago University has studies this "lazy p7.'osecu-
tor" argu.mant and finds that it 1tslights some 1.:mportant consideration:::, such as 
the necessity of showing probable cause before the trial is i:rl.tiated; the 
reluctance of prosecutors, intent on their record of convictions, to rely on 
the possibUity' of the defendant's convicting bimseJ.f; the tact that effective 
interrogation presupposed careful investigation; and the fact that, the most 
(·~retul investigation may be ineffective without interrogation of the suspect. 
Moreover, it ?l~ down the protection provided for the defendant by the court 
and counsel. .18 
It. frontal attack ns made upon the .mendment in 1910 by the Wisconsin 
branch of' the .!m!rican Ir!stitute of Crirrln~ Law and Criminology. This body 
believed that ttthe p%'1)vision of 0'1.11" Constltuilon that tWo 'Oerson shall be 
, ~ 
cowpelled in 8l\V criminal case to be a witness against himself" has ~n\.·'~l~_ved 
its usefulness, and should he abolished, and that t.i.ereby one hlding-place of 
crima would be destroyed. .19 
The N_ York Constitutional Convention, besides ~tst1ng the adv<:lntages of 
the Fifth Amendment, drew up .8~t of grievancest 
113 Meltser, 687. 
19Qu.oted in Wigmre, ,313. 
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(1) The privilege is a h.1.ding !llace for crime. Overwhelming oiftloulties 
cOnf'ront the government today in the detection and prosecution of crime. 
In the caS8 of a large number of offenses the proof is difficult, if net 
inpo8s1ble, of Ascertainment without the testimony of individuals acces-
sory to the act. • .. .. Ever.! day in some court of some city, an uncon-
trolled resort to the privilege results in a miscarriage of justice. 
Legal writers are of the opini0n that tl14t rule has becm':'l8 a mat effective 
technicality available to the criminal to escape p'mishmant and hinder 
prosecution. 
(2) It has developed the "inrnunity bath" misdhief. The detection and con-
viction of criminals hasso eff'eotive~ been hampered by this license that 
in order to secure 80100 evidence, the Leg:i.slature has had to ?8SS various 
statutes granting amnesty to criminals. • • and infinite mischief has 
"!)Glan the result. 
tn Onl:r the ~lilty have use for the privilege.. The natural Wtq of findini 
out whether a person hascomm:l.tteda certain act is to ask him aboct it, 
and if he dcmies it, to make him explain an;{ circumstances ";)Ointing to him 
as the person who did it. Once a criminal trial ceases to be a game, what 
evidence is l.1.kely to be so informing as that of the ~)arty alleged by the 
State to have committed the act under investigation. 
(4) 1'odq the accused person's rights are amply protected without the 
privilege. Unless torture is confounded with interrogation, there is no 
renon for the privilege today. With the publicity given to criminal 
trials, the rule that a defendant shall be represonted by counsel, the 
t8ci11 ties tor appeal atter verdict, the scrutiny applied to the record 
by the appellate courts, the liberality nth which the pardoning power is 
exercised, the conviction of' innocent·mm is practically unhearp of •••• 
The necessity of guarding against governmental viciousness has ceased, 
and the rule is si~4' " convenient loophole for gull ty parties to escape 
punishment. 
(5) The l)rovision has outlived its social utility. The impression now 
held by the ~)ublic is that cri1a-l defense is a game consisting of the 
introduotion of technicalities. 
However t..lU.s New York Constituti0nal Conventi".;n adjourned without 'Yl&ld.ng 
any changes in the privileGe against solf-incr1minati~n. The new Constitution 
of 1939 repeats the language of t!1.e old llew York Constitutlon. 
one or the ll¥)st outspoken attacks on the aroondment was delivered by Mr. 
~~ 2! ~ ~ Revision Commission, 378-9-80. 
55 
Carman in the !l1nnes~t! .!e! .... Re ... vi;,.;;.;.eW' ...1 "The law reeks with judicial eloquence 
about fair trials and the rights of the criminal. But there never Vlas a fair 
crime ool'l'llIitted; nor a crim1nal entitled to arr::r rights whatsoever arisin.~ from 
any crime cormnitted by him. although he may stUl claim the benefit of the 
wrongs inherent ill this archaic constitutional privilege of concealine the 
evidence ot his guUt-of stabbing in the baok the ver'J govertllIlmJ~ ullder which 
he claims such privUege. • • .. In a well ordtn."8d society, to speak of the 
rights of a criminal appertaining to his crime is a perversion of both languag 
and logic. There can be no such thing. A criminal haG 1'10 such rights under 
filii' government worthy ot respect untU he hae first paid the penalty for his 
crime. tl2l 
Mr. Carman believes th.t the privilege is the C01!1'l1011 shield of the crimin 
ot both high and low estate, offering a doorway to inmuni ty for the injuries 
which both have in.tlictad upon the people of our land. "Remove it; make 
criminal trials a coma:>n sense investtgat!t?n of the guilt or innocence of the 
• 
accused, about 'Which he knows the rllOst and ne:tUl"Cllly should be the first to 
testity' and disclose his knowledge, abolish all rUles of evidence that are 
rooted in such constitutional. privileges of the cri::m..nal-including the 
illogical pres~tion that the accllsed is innocent untll pr&ven gull ty, 'Which 
is equivalent to IX' esumtng that the grand jurors who indicted him were ai ther 
stupid or corrup~d the crime problem would sease to be such. ,,22 
2lErnest C. Carman, itA Plea for Withdrawal of the Constitutional Pr1.vUege 
Against Self-Incrimination. It !i1nnesot~ !!!! Review, XXII, 200. 
22Ibid. 
-
Mr. Richard C • .Baker, • member of the New' York Bar, would also like to 
aboLish the Fifth Amend1!l!lnt, and denies that tD do so would lnjure our cherisb8( 
presumption of innocence until proven ~ty'. "It is alleged that without thiS 
exemption the defendant would be required to exculpate himself. Nothing, 
however, is farther from the t1""'llth. In mst states, even if the immunity did 
not exist. the prosecution wou.ld still be called upon to bear the burden ot 
pl"Oof 1:n a cr:tminal proceeding" and also to convince the jury of the defendant' 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The absence of the immunity' might make it 
easier for the state to !)rove oertain facts, but 'WOuld not in itself shUt t.he 
onus of establishing his innocence to the accused.-23 
Abolition of the privilege might make the job of prosecutor a little less 
burdensome then, but Mr. Baker can find nothing mrally, ethiCally, legally, 
or oonstitution~ wrong with making a conviction less difficult tor the 
prosecution.. so long as it is just as sound. 
Professor WignDre speaks of the duty at giving what evidence OM is 
• 
capable of giving. Chlef Justice Marshall irrthe trial of Aaron Burr referred 
to the principle "which entitles the United States to the teBtil'!D~ of ever.r 
ci tiaen. .. This duty' is essential to the orderly tunctiomng of society. The 
right of subpoena .. th«t is the right to :reQ.u1re other people to give evideDcej 
is fundamental not. only to the welfare of the State but to the protection of 
the citizen. Indeed, the defendant's right of compulsOl"7 process in criminal 
trials, the right of subpoena, is a rtrOvision of the 13m of Rights, Article 
Six. Therefore when we allow a witness to plead the FU'th Amendment, we mfV 
23a1chard C. Baker. -Self-Incrimination, - Amerioan Bar Assooiation Journal 
ILII.,. 6.35-6. -
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e deprivine the defendant of his rights under the Sixth Aroondmentl 
Logiaall.y why should not a person charged with a ar~ be obliged to give 
at explanation he can of the affair? ,1b¥ should he have the privilege of 
ilenae? Does he not owe a duty to the publio the same as aIJY" other witness? 
he is innoeent ~e has nothing to fear} if guilty, to jill with him. The 
at formidable objection to this reaso~~ is that without the p~_vile~e we 
eopen ~le door to torture. But this argument 1s simply not realistic and 
'gnores the other safeguards adequate and available to the defendant. Centuries 
,0 when the privilege was introduced the judge was the prosecutor, too, and 
jury trill, nor right to counsel, nor appellate system. such as we 
In this whole area we are deal1ng with intangibles" and a strictly logical" 
Ontllate:q satiSfying conclusion defies and eludes us. The immensely reppected 
rioan Law Institute has indicated that the priviler:;e has served its purpose 
and seen :'Lts d8iY. On the other hand, the N~ YOrk State nar Association, a 
ody of national prestice ~nd influence, adopted in 195.3 the report ot its 
mmittee on CivU Rights which enbodied this resolution. "That the const1tu-
lonal privilege against self-incrimination continues to be a vi t!ll safeguard 
f individual freedom, and the Bar shouJ.d educate the public as to i ts i~r-
nee and diseou.r&,.,;e both those who "WOuld restrict its application and tilose 'Who 
uld abuse it by asserting it improperJ.;y-.. ,,24 
In the face of suoh eminent authority on both sides, I take II some.,hat 
ddle C01~e. I remain oonvinoed that in regar' to a defendant, the privilege 
24Quoted by Louis 'lta].dman,. "The Fifth AJoon~nt, Shield or Sword, It Vital. 
eeohes XXII, 169. 
no longer sen~s Q useful function in nndern Anglo-American jurisprudence. In 
our concern for the one innocent .... r:tct:i.rn., we are parmi tt:tng not nine, but ninety 
nine r-nilt,y to escQpa from justice. At. that I have read many hy-pothetical, but 
not one factual account of an innocnnt person wholly incapable of '.J!'ov:tng his 
are those innocent that it protect~? 
I SUt:;rrest then, that the Fifth koondmant requires Some roodification. In 
t.."le concrete, I would withdraw the option of taking the stand from the defen-
dant at the trial stage, but would reserve the privilege to him 2.t the pre-
trial stage, by insisting that no person be cOl!pelled to be a witness against 
hinseU untU ·properJ,y presented, tt that is untU formally indicted by II grand 
Ju.ry or other established Quthorit..v. 
Witne~ses too shoUld retain their claim to the privilege if asked an in-
criminating question, for theoretical.ly' they are not even under suspiCion of 
crime and have not been indio ted for aJ:V nd~deed. Were this not so, the trial 
of the defendant could quic~ bacOii'!e a pretext for getting at the witness. 
This is in accord 'with the age old principle that no one need disclose his own 
hidden cri:naSI "While no one is required to betray himself. nevertheless one 
-
!'!puted .!2 E! fiuU,& ~ !?! reSuire,d .!2. pres0nt himself ~ vindicate .h.!! 
innocence if he can."2$ 
...... ;.;..;... .............. _--
Onl,y if the cri!OO has been suf.ficiently bruited about to vtarrant indict-
ment, can the suspect be questioned abo,:t his guilt. 
I 
! 
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To s1.trrt"llarize this positionr The defendant m.IiG" claim the privi1.ege tmtU 
rormal~ indicted. A witness ;1Ily claim the privilege whenever his answer 
wou~d inoriminate him. This Drl.vilep:e wou.ld!j e available to the w::ttness 
. '. 
whether quest,ioned in a civll or criminal C01J.rt or before ;1 congressional 
committee. 
With these distinctions in effect, I feel sure that crirrl.:lal trials VlouJ.d 
be less frustrating and abortive, and t.'1.at the courts in our land vfculd reach 
• new and exalted scale in the diS't:xmsat,lon of genuine justice, vmere all 
aoqui ttals would be based on evidence, not on ignorance •. 
At the same time those rights and liberties of our people wot~ld he rre-
served which guarantee to each of us freedom from any arbitrarr intrusion in 
our private lives by' the fearsome power of the State. 
CHAPTJ:i:R V 
PREStr.!PTIO!~ OF' GUIL'l AND BlIlU1UTY STAnJTES 
roES Th'VOCATION OF 'fHE FIFTH AMBNDMENT CREATE 
A PREST1MP'rION OF GUILT? 
We have already seen that the nrj.vllege agail'\.Bt sel.t-1ncrilrr.ination should 
be withdrawn from defendants but retained for witnesses. Our next conoern is 
to determine whether the plea of the privUege by a witness eives rise to an 
inference of guilt which would justify an employer in firing M.m, or refltSing 
to hire him., etc. NotiC$ that we are not seeking to use this plea as evidence 
of guilt leading to conviction, for our wi t~s is not on trial. The precise 
.. .... 
• issues, then, that we are seeking to solve a~whether the plea of t..~ Fifth 
Amendnsnt creates a pres~tion of !'1uUt., and if it does, whether that !lre-
s~tion can be used against the m.t.ness in other areas such as emp1crTnllmt. 
In BoIvin!:, these questions we shall have recourse in part to those cases 
where the .~erendant has taken Qdvant,~ of the privilege. He does not plead 
it. in so many words, but the reason a defendant cannot be compelled to ta.ke the 
st.and is beeause he cannot under th() ":lreaent Constitution be comoel1ed to be a 
vii t.ness against himself in a federal. court. So whatever the courts have said 
about the inference of guilt which OQn or cannot be drawn from the f.ailure of 
60 
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the defendant to testify can be said with equal force of a witness WO pleads 
, - -
the Fifth Amendment. 
Twenty years ago ttd.s ;)%'Oblem ''Ie now deal lvi th appeared to have been 
solvedt 
UntU menile1'8 of the Communist Party began invoking the Fifth Amendment, 
the lWral issue seemd jllain enough. The right to a specifiC post in 
private or public employment is not • civil right. This is III rticular~ 
true where an individual holds II position of [.ni>lic or private trust. 
Winning and holding such positions of trust are contingent ~ryon fulftIl-
ment of certain qualifications. these qualifications are not y.1erely 
technical. proficiency but extend to traits of character. They include 
recognition and acC9ptance of the nnrtl obligations that ;:~ with the post. 
AnDng them are the honorable fultil.l:ment of one 1 s duties, candid and above 
board behavior on all matters pertaining to the tasks that are involved. 
At the ver.r least, an individua). 111 • position of trust mu.st so comport 
himself that he does not undermine confidence in himself or the institu-
tion that in the public flYe lie represents. Art:! boq ~ keep out of jail 
by involC1ng the priv1loge against self-incrimination. But there are many 
posts in which we may legitimately req~ standards of conduct hir)ler 
than those sufficient to keep out of jail. 
And the solution agreed upon was that an employee might have a constitu-
tional right to silence but he had 110 such right to his job. In 1939 in the 
case of PhristaJ. v. !!!! ~anciscol it was held that the holder of a ~oveI"lllmnt 
beneti t or grant would be permitted the use of the Fifth Amendment hut denied 
further enjoyment of the benefit. 2 Here several policemen invoked the privUeg 
when questioned about the magnitude of their banl~ accounts. The Police Com-
missioner dismissed them rro~ the forcel th~ appealed and the court declared. 
ttDuty required them to mswer. Privilege permitted them to refuse to answer. 
They chose to exercise t..he ~)r1v1lege, but the exercise of such priv:1.1eeo was 
lsidney Hook. Common Sense.!!!!! .!h! Fifth Amendment (Rew York, 1957), 72-3. 
233 Cal. App. >64; 92 P.2d. U6. 
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wholJ;r inconsistent with their duty as police officers. tt3 An illinois oourt 
held that use of the privilege was "conduct unbecoming an offieer" of the 
Police Department. of the City of Ch:tC8r:o.4 
Thus, as Sidney Book pointed 0 nt, it did seem clear that the plea of the 
Fifth Amendment 1'10 incompatible with a position ot trust. &wever with the 
advent of the Communist conspiracy and the efforts of the government to expose 
the extent of their infiltration, t.he whole area has somhow been reopened to 
debate. Prior to that time the Fifth A.mendment was so closelY associate4 with 
the oriminal element that the courts could denounce the privilege as Done not 
resorted to by honest mrm •• $ But now that the spotlight has shifted over from 
graft and corruption to the ideology' of the llberal left, resting upon the in-
tel1eetual e11te of education, SCience" and art, somehow the very same plea 
gives rise to • ver:t dU'ferent connotation., We are now asked at times to sua-
pend our judgment; at others, to see in the plea the cry of wounded innocence". 
or a ringing challenge to despotic power by ,a ~yr for civil liberties. 
" 
One of the leading proponents of • ttstainlessrt Fifth AmendDmt is Dean 
Griswold of the Harvard La School, whose recent book on this subject has en-
joyed wide circulation and exerted great influence. The Dean asserts that the 
plea of the privilege reveals nothing about the guilt or innocanoe of the 
claimant himself. In support of this, the Dean proposes thNe or four hyp0-
thetical oases in which the witness is innocent !>.l PYeethesisJ yet ror one 
3Ibi3 
4339 Ill. App. 33; 88 B.E.2d. 728 (1949). 
>United States v. Mammoth Oil Co., 14 F.2d. 705 (1926) • 
...................... --
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reason or another pleads the privilege. And of course as the Dean points out. 
to ir>..t:er from the plea that theEIS r~n were gu1l~ would be manifest error since 
~ hlr0~lesis tha,1 are innocent. 
Sidney Hook counters by asking what a normal person wou.ld do When faced 
with a pointed gun? His normal reaotion w1ll be alarm and an effort to get out 
of range, for the overwhelming we:tght of sXperia!loe teaches that such • situa-
tion could be mrtally da.l1geroUS. Now if' we assume by hypothesis that the gun 
is empty then aU the flurry and scurry appears a little ridiculous, but not 
unreasonable, for the victim does not know that the gun is empty and harmless, 
but relies on experience which says that it is dangerous. So too experience 
teaches that the majority of people who plead the Fifth Amendment are shielding 
guilt.. "The psychologicfl, tendency to draw an adverse Werence from the in-
vocation of the privilege is not innate. It hasheen acquired as a result of 
experi.ence. It 1s so strong that it would hard:1y be an exaggeration to charao-
ten .. it today as natural or nol'1!Ull. Beca¥StI of the place of the privilege 
in the rules of procedure, the IlIff'S of some bUt. not all states warn expressly 
against, the nat'l.1nl1 tendency to draw an adverse inference if the defendant 
does not testifY in hiso'Wl'l behalf to rebut an aeeusation...P 
OM can construct hypotheses of innocence ~ infinitum. The ?oint at taBU 
is ·~'lhether thcf'{ correspond with expt-il'ience. It is rather strange th~t after a 
life in the 1_" Dean Gri81lO1d must have recourse to hypothesis, rather than 
CUes to SU5yport his contention., 
The ru1es of evidence, jury t.rials, and all the machL'1.ery of ,justice are 
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not proof agdnst oocasional injustica. The 18 does not demand of a jury that 
they find t.1.9 defendant guilty with rldaphy'sicalcertainty, nor even :ooral 
certainty, but oIlly' that the guilt of the d.efendmt be est.Ushed beyond 
reasonlQ:)le doa'bt. So too the pres~tion of guilt arising from t,i.e plea of' the 
Fift..'It kllmdment is not conclusive, for not eve!I one who pleads the privilege 
is shieldinr; guilt, but must we therefore act as though no one were? 
The Supreme Court recently indtcated that we must. In SJ.oehower v. Board 
!! ~ucation 2! !!!! ~ !:?! !!!! ?!,ork, a Cit-.f College professor had been dis-
missed under a New York Oi ty Afunicipal Charter provision reqltiring the dis-
charge, vdt.hOilt notice or hearing, of a municipal employee utilizing t..he privi-
lege against. selt .. incrimination in refusing to answer legally authorized' in-
quiries as to his official conduct. 7 Slochower" in his appearance hefore a 
oonGressional committee L~stigating matters of national security, refused to 
answer questions regarding past membership in ~~e Communist Party, and was stib-
sequen~ tired 1n accord 'With the Charter p;",ovision. Fi va maSers of the 
• 
United States Supreme Court held that the dismissal was inpooper because no 
inference or • witness' guilt of past memership in the Communist party 1~ be 
drawn from hi.s refusal, on the ground of possible self-incrimination, to IIIlS'ftr 
questions of .. congressional commtttee respecting such membership. 
The majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice Cllll'k who asserted t,hat 
the New York Charter abridged a privilege or inmranity of a citizen of ·!:.he Unitecl 
states since it in effect imposes a ~enal~ on the exercise of a federally 
guaranteed right in II federal proee~ding., It also violates due process because 
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the rrere claim of privilege under the Fifth Amendment does not provide :a 
reasonable basis for the state to t.erndnate his employment. 
Furthermore the Court condemned the practice of imputing a sinister maani.ni 
to the exercise of the privilege. "In ~"'llman v. U;nit~d States, we derided the 
assumption that those who claim this 'Jrivilege are either criminals or per-
jurers. The privilege against selt-incri!1Il.nation would be reduced to a hollow 
IJDCkery if' its .. reise would be taken as equivalent either to a confession of 
guilt or a conal us1ve presumption of perjlll".Y •••• A witness lUY have a 
reasonable fear ot prosecution and yet be innocent of 8l\Y wrongdoing. The 
privilege serves to protect the innocent who othendae might be ensnared by 
anbiguous circumstances. itS 
In • dissenting opinion by' Mr. Justice Reed, in which Justioes !.Jinton and 
Burton concurred. it was said that a leg.~ authorised bo~ has a right to 
demand that citizens furnish facts pertinent to official inquiries, and althougJ 
the duty to respond IUy be refused for p8rs~nal protection against prosecution, 
'. a refusal to furnish such information can proper~ be considered to stanp a 
public employee as a person unfit to hold certain orfic.iaJ. positions. 
In his separate dissent, Mr. Justice Harlan declared that teachers who 
have refused to answer questions concerning their official conduct are no 
longer quilitied for public school teaching, on the ground that their retusal 
to answer jeopardis.es the COnfidence the publlc would have in its school system.. 
IIfr. Louis 'Waldman finds that Ifthe use of the rifth Amendment as a means of 
convicting people in the public eye is disturbing and frighteninr and is doub:q-
6 Ibid. 699. 
-
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wrong. It does great injustice to the person so described. And at the same 
tim it dev-ades thts constitutional !'rivUege in the minds of the public • .,9 
;,tt-. WalcllnAn t S argument rinds su.p'f:)Ort in the case of ~urdick v. .!!Ili teq 
States whioh held that the 'privilege supposes "only a possibility of a charge 
of crime md tnterposed protection ~a.i.nst the charge, and 1"eaehin~ beyond it. 
~ai_nst f'ltmtshing what might be llt"~ed as evidence to support it ... 10 Alld 80 
it is not neoessaril3' 8 sense of t.!uilt that entttles a person to '9TO?E!rly plead 
the !'l"1vllol1'e. Fear of prosecution 19 su.t"fioient, for it is a l1enooe to the 
peace, ::,;ood name, and dignity of an ~_ndividW. even if the trial. should result 
in acqUittal. Thus the facts which a witness hides behil'ld the Fifth A.'!lendnent 
marr not be proof of guilt but still suf.ficiently incriminating to eX!'ose him 
to prosecution. 
John Cogley, writing in Comnnnweal, cites further reasons for caution 
. .. 
before drQw:tnr~ ~ conclusions' from a plea of the privilege. He decla~s that 
"~ituat1ons must be taken into account befo~ al\j conclusions are reached • 
• There is no unavoidable" inescapable, inevitable conclusion to be reached nerelJ 
beoartM someone has invoked the Fifth Lll'll':tm:imnt. It is as illor;ical to conclude 
automatically that he is guilty of the thing charged as it would be to conclude 
that he is innocent ot it. !he ciroumtanoes of • congressional hearing are 
spec:!.al indeed and each ease varies. The matter depends much on. the natrl.re ot 
the imolied charges, the character of the committee and its counsol, and the 
real--as distinct from the nominal-rmrposes of the comm:t.ttee."ll 
9Louis Waldman .. "The Fifth Amendment," Vital. SpeechesJ nIl, 192. 
1'" 
"'236 if;) 79, 94 (1914) •. 
11 John Cogley. "1,lhe Controversial Firth," CommnJ\veal. Ll'VIt 86. 
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This tolerant, liberal attitude towardS the Fifth !nendlMnt which the 
toregoing opinions and articles have expressed was not alw&tys in vogue. In 
Sta~ v. !,art,fett, the court declQ!'('l!d that Dan inference does arise un.deniab13. 
It 1s evidence the tore. of which mJlt?' depend ~'r)on circumstances. rtl2. tfSuoh an 
inference is natural and irresistible. It will be drawn by honest jurymen. find 
no instructions w1.ll. prevent it. • • • The rights ot aooused are not :i.nvaded 
or denied by 'Proper co1Illtent upon his sUenoe •• 13 For apart from the Fifth 
Amendment, it is • eenertal principle of the 1_ of evidence that silenoe gives 
rise to an adverse inference. In tact an eminent law;rer has described silence 
as "one ot the mst powerful inferences" if not the met p.artu.l :tnf'ermce .. in 
hUmml af'tail'8.1Il4 Even in crimtnal cases where the silence ot the accused is 
based upon 1m il1{>l1clt appeal to the Fifth AmendIoont, some states" as Ohio. 
provide in their constitutions that. the jury mq draw such inferenoe as it sees 
fit from the failure of the defendant to test1f'y in his own behalf, And that in 
summation the ~rosecution ~ comrnant on thi~ silence of the defendant • 
• 
Ho1ntver in other states it is forbidden b:t' statute to dr_ an adverse in-
ference from the silence ot the Mfendant in a criminal trial. Professor 
Preenleat of Harvard was, .t the tine these statutes were introduoed, the author 
~f the leading treatise on the law of evidence. He made the following interes-
~1ng comrrent. -It ~ be doubted whether a statute which prohibits any such in-
~erence is not nugatory as contrar,y to ~he human mind. A. statute that upon 
Us, Me. 200 (l.867). 
l3parker v. ~tate. 39 AU. 651 (1898). 
(, lhc. D. w:1.lli_, "The Fifth Araend;'rsnt.,tt Ma:3uettel:!! Review, XXXIX 
~rr1nter, 195;.6)~ 210. 
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proof that the sun was shining, no inference that it was light should be drawn 
by the jury, if' not against the eonstitution of a State, is against the nature 
of things. 015 
It .... ould seem safe to say that Professor Greenleaf' would join ~ Britail 
Ohio, New Jersey, and a few other states in allowing comment to the jUl'",{ about 
an inference so natural. The inference is also allowed in California by con-
sti tutional amendment, so t hat the pertinent article now reads I "No person 
shall be co~elled to be a witness aga1n8t himselt in ADY criminal case. .. • 
but in att:I criminal oase, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure 
to explain or to deny by- his testimny tmy evidence or facts in the case aga1rur 
him may be cotmnented upon by the court and by cotUlSel, and may be oonsidered 
by the court or jU17.ttl6 
The interesting case of Admiral De1re,y Adamson v. Oalltond. arose under 
this particular article of the California Constitution.,17 At his trial, 
Adamson pleaded the privilege as guaranteed by the State Constitution., The 
• court allowed co~nt as as also permitted by- the same Constitution.,. Adamson 
appealed. on the now familiar 8rgunmlt that comment violated the FU'th Amendment 
of the Federal Bill of Rights which had been incorporated (he argued) in the 
rights guaranteed to every citizen by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme 
Court rejected t.he arg1.1Illellt" citing ~ v. !!! J~rsez as authority. In his 
majority opinion, :Mr. Justice Reed saids "However sound IllCY be the legislative 
-
15nreenleaf, Evidence, 14th ed. (Boston, 18S:n .. I, 45l. 
16Constitution of California, Article 1, ru. 
1.791 L.ed. 190) (1948). 
I. 
conclusion that an accused should not be compelled in any criminal case to be 
a witness ar::ainst hlmselt, we see no reason why comment shotud not be made 
upon M.B silence. It seem8 natura! that when a defendant has opportunity to 
deny or explain facts and determines not to do so, the prosecution should bring 
out the strength of the evidence by commenting upon the defendant's failure to 
explain or deny it. The prosecution"s evidence "IJJIq be of facts that may be 
beyond the knowledge of the accused. If so, ld.s taUure to testifY would have 
little, if a!\V, weight. But the facts mB3' be such as are necessaril..v in the 
knowledge of the accused, in that case a faUure to explain would point to an 
inabillty to uplain.-18 
And in a separate concurring opinion Mr. Justice Frankfurter declared that 
"sensible and just-minded men, in important artilia of life, deem it sirmifi-
cant that a man remains silent when confronted with serious and responsible 
evidence against himself which it is within hi8p()'1'f0l" to contradict. The notion 
that to allow jurore to do that which senaib,le and right-minded man do every d-" 
" 
violates the immutable principles of just1.ce .. conceived by • civil1~ed socie~ 
is to trivialize the itlt>Ortance of due process ... 19 
The federal law of the Un! ted States express~ forbids comment upon the 
silence of the accused. 20 But this exclusion is c18ar~ a matter of policy and 
not Ii denial that the silence has evidentiary value" for the SuprelOO Court, as 
in the Adamson Cllse, has said that. the aUenee of the a ccused is genuine evi-
l.8Ibid. 
-
20Act of March 16, 1818, 20 Stat. 301 U.S.c., tit. 28, sec. 632 (1926). 
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denc. which can be submitted to the jury where there is not an express statutol"j 
provision to the oontrar,y. 
This attitude, of course, has not found universal acceptance. In Colorado 
the SUpreme Court of the State held that if an inference is drawn from silence 
there is a :oractical abrosation of the constitutional provision that no man is 
to be conpe1led to incriminate hImself'. "For if the silenoe is to be taken as 
evidence of guilt, the defendant.s option is of little avail; he is praetio~ 
forced to testify" and once upon the stand may be required to give the very 
testimony upon whioh his conviction shall rest ... 21 But cases so holding are in 
a minority. And it must be noted that even here the inferenoe is rejected not 
because it is invalid" but because :i. t is deemed to oontlic. with the right of 
the accused not to incriminate himself. 
When we look to the rule in .!:!2..n-01"..;;;.;;.i .. mi;;;;;;;;;D ... al .. proceedings we find that almst 
without exception it is the general holding that an adverse inference alw~ 
follows from an invoCation of the i'ifth Amendment. In United States v. Malmmth 
• Oil Co. the oourt asked. "Why is silence the -answer of a former cabin,at officer 
--
to the oharge of oorruption? Why is silence the onl;y repl¥ of Sinclair .. a man 
of large b~iness affairs, to the charge of bribing an official of his govern-
ment? Wh.y" is thiB plea of selt-incrimination-one not resorted to by honest 
man-tbe refuge of Fall's son-in-law, Everhart?,.22 
SO we have seen that in both civil and criminal cases the plea of the 
Amendnmlt alVl8y'8 gives rise to an inference of guilt, but that in a criminal 
21Patite v. People. 8 Colo. 518, 9 Pac. 622 (J.B9$); see also Maffie v. 
united states, 2~ ,.~a. 22$ .. and Qginion ~~ Justices, 126 N.E.2d. 100. 
2~ 1.2d. 70" 729 (1926). 
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case the inferenoe arising out of the sUenoe of the aocused oannot be called 
to the attention of the jury and made t.he subject of com'nent, except in those 
few states which so permit. However the inference is nonetheless real and 
perceptible even the~, for it is not a mere ooincidence that in the great 
majority of oriminal cases the ju.ry finds guilty alt'! defendant who has failed 
1:.0 take the stand. "None of the courts and none of the authorities ••• oan 
deny that in every case in which the defendant refuses to take the stand the 
tact will be noticed by the jury and that the jury will draw the natural in-
ferences therefrom.,.23 
That such a real and valid inference can be drawn has also long been 
recognized by the legal profession. The American Law Institute in its lbde1 
Code of Evidenoe states that the rule should bet nIt an accused i.n a criminal 
--
action does not testUy, the judge and counsel may co:mm&nt upon the accusedts 
faUure to testify, and the trier of fact T£JIIY draw an reasonable inferences 
therefrom. Comment. 'fbis has been aecepted ~nowhere at comnon law except in 
• 
IMine and oossibly New Jersey and Connecticut~· In most states a. sta-l:.ute or the 
current interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision prohibits all 
COntlllmt and inferences. Such enactments have usual.ly prevented the evolution 
or development of a oottmlOn law doctrine in this country. In Iowa oomment is 
now permitted as a result of the repeal of III statute which forbnde S11Ch oOmnDnt' ~4 
It seems clear then that the 1)lea of the Fifth Amendment in whatever 
situation alWl!l'.Y1l creates ,. presumption or inferenoe of guilt. The presUFlption 
23 AndrE:w A.. Brucet "Failure of the Accused to Testif"J .. " ~hir;sn ~ 
Revi,!;M (Deceni>er, 1932), 230. 
24Anerican Law Institute, Model ~.2! Evidence. Rule 201, (3). 
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is not conclusive but it does have evidentiary value, more or less Mpending 
upon aU the facts and circumstances. One of the facts or circrunstances which 
will al~s have to be considered, especiall1 in the investip,ation of Gommunis~ 
is the holding; of the Bogers case.25 Under examination, the ,rl.tness Rogers 
answered a few questions abou.t preaant communist membership, but then ~1eaded 
the Fifth Amenc:Imnt when pressed about nrior menbership. The COlU"t held that 
once Rogers chose to answer ~ question on this matter, she wai~ her privi-
lege as to .!!! questions on the matter. In the light of this caso, if a 
witness were asked 1£ she were 8 Communist party member in the year 1900 
(twenty-five years .. say, before she was born)" she would have to plead the 'ift]: 
Amendment and retuse to aJ'l8\'rer. The question is hardl.y incriminating, but if 
she answers it, she may be asked about memberShip in the year 1945, and perhaps 
this repl;y would b. considerab~ r001"$ el'.li>arrassing. I am afraid this decision 
is an unfortlmate extension of the sound rule in criminal law that when an 
accused takes the stand he 1'!lUSt remain for cross-examination. There we can see 
why an aocused should not be allowed to tell.,all the good things white main-
taining It discreet sUeno. about the bad. However to apply the same Jmle to 
W':i:tnesse~ can only have the effect of drying up' the tont. But good or bad, we 
can see that the holding of the Roeers case is a very i~ortant circumstanoe to 
be considered in weighing the value of the inference. 
This settled, we can go on to consider the second question. 'Whether an 
emplo;rer in a sensitive field m&y fire An employee who invotted his privilege 
when called as a witness betore the oourt or congressional oommittee. We know 
2SRogers v. tmited states,.. 95 L.ed. .344 (1950). 
I 
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that this plea gives rise to an inference of guilt .. but can 'We use that in-
ference to fire the employee? laster Justice Holmesthought so 'When he held thai 
the -petitioner rtIlr3' have a constitutional right to talk polities, but he has no 
constitutional right to be a pollceman.,tt26 The highest court of Uassachusetts 
thought so when it held that a teaoher employed to serve "at discretion" in the 
Boston Public Schools cOL~ld be dismissed for refusing to answer. on the ground 
of the privilege against self-incrimination, the questions of a subconmdttee of 
the United States Senate as to whether he was II meDber of the Connmmist Party .. 2' 
The Supreme Court of the United States at least used to think so (before the 
810011ower decision) when it held that the fact that divuJ.ging ;last or present 
membership in the Communist party might under some oirculJ.lllrtances amount to 
selt'-inoriuti.nation did not divest the government of power to require anBy,rera 
28 
as a condition of continued employment. 
In addition, the PresidenU of Harvard and Dartnnuth, as well as the 
American Assooiation of University Professo~s have all publlcl;y" stated that the 
• plea of the Fifth Amendment creates an inference of guilt as a matter ot com 'IOn 
sens8.29 If'. faculty nember invokes the Fifth ArJl8ndnJent, his institution can-
not ignore the possible significance for itself of these matters. It must be 
said that the aforementioned do not consider the pa.ea as tantaroount to resig-
nation as the lin York Chal'lter did, but rather as a matter inviting f.ull inves-
2~Au.U.tj'e V. !'!! Beators, 155 Mass. 2J.6. 29 N..E. 517 (1892). 
27"axon v. School Committee 2.! Boston. 120 N.E.2d. 772 (1954). 
28nartlEtr v. Board 2! Public VIm-ks, 95 L.ed. 1317 (19.51). 
29 Hook, COll11IDn Sense ~ ~ !.i!'.~ Amendment (New York .. 1957): 7h, B9, 95. 
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tieal:.ion which could lead to terminat,ion of services if' the fact.s warrant. 
Fl~fessor Sidn8,y Hook describes the Slochower decision as one of the most 
scandalous opinions in the histor,v of the Supra_ Court. lilisn t.~a court de-
clared that Sloehowerfs plea of the FU'th AlllmdlOOnt created no in.faranoe of 
guilt, it was shockingl.y unrealistic. -iil'lCm it denied the right of' the local 
govenL~nt to establish norms of fitness for its personnel, it great~v curt_ilAd 
the already diminis..'ling authority of state and local goverIL1Ient. It can only 
Ibe hoped that in the future the case will be clis tinguished and restrioted to 
the narrow holding that" statute 'Whioh provides for automatio .,dismissal with-
out hearing is unconstitutional as II violation of' due process, but that the 
r:i.e;ht of the states to dismiss comIn1inists from sensitive posts after proper 
hearing has in no w~ been impaired. 
In conolusion. since the plea does create a presumption of guilt, the 
sounder opinion by far, it seems to me, would permit an employer to dismiss 
ctf employee who pleads the Fifth Amendment. if the nature of the office is 
such that the oocupant must be above suspioion~ No one questioned the right 
of George lMany, President of the A. F. ot L. to fire David Beck froll the Ex-
scutt w Counoil of the Union when he habitually resorted to the FUth A;nendment 
during an investigation of Union funds. The substitution ot Com.nU'''ist party 
r'Jenooership for financial. mali'easance as the field of inquirp' does not reaJJy 
change the nature or character of the plea. A presumption of guilt arises in 
both cases and will have greater or less value depending upon all the circum-
stances. But value it has, and existence too. 
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THE ADEQUACY OF r,iM,TINITI STATllTES 
Legislatures of State and Federal governments have felt it necessar,r from 
time to time to pass imnuni ty statutes which empower the government, when con-
fronted by a plea of the Fifth ~ndl:lIgnt, to offer complete imrnimiV to the 
witness or defendant in exchange for the critical information. The immtmity 
is complete. It extends beyond the testimol\V given and reaches to the crime 
itselt.30 ~he immunity l1lq be granted at the option of the state, 1lhile the 
individual. has no choice but to accept if tendered him. 
These immunity statutes have u two hundred year history in EnP.'.,land and 
have been popular in the united States at least hill that time. Their obvioUIJ 
function is to obtain the evidence 'Which the State finds indispensable tor leg-
islation or prosecution, but which hitherto was inaccessible behind the FU'th 
Amendment. In balancing the rights of' the individual against the ~gencies 
of the state, the imnuni ty statute was devised as an equitable compromise. A 
compromise and not a complete substitute-for the position of the witness is 
undenid:>J;r altered, and that for the worse. B~fore, he could plead the privi-
lege and risk obly the inference of¢lt, which is never conclusive and always 
to some degree uncertain. But once imtrnized, he must tell the whole story of 
his inf'al1tY, in all its details. leaving no room for doubt or the benign inter-
pretation. 
3OCounselman v. Hitchcock. l42 US 547 (1891). 
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The great connict over these iw.muni ty statutes rages over the intf)nt of 
the Founding F ather8 as to the scope of the AUVjndmen t.. Those in favor of the 
statutes insist that the Fathers mAant only that the defendant should not be 
made to convict himself., The opponentn insist that the AmendilJent was designed 
to protect reputation and honor and [xt;"ivacy, all ot which r~ have as much, and 
perhaps nnre, value than mere physical freedom. To the forner an immunity 
statute is entirely adequate) to the latter a grave injustioe. 
The question here is to determine the intent of the legislators, and since 
that is the function of the judiciar,r, let usturn to the cases. Before doing 
so, however, it might be ovserved that our inquiry into this field has onlY 
an academic value, for there is no lildihood-not even under the present Supre 
Court-that the uniform decisions of eeventy-five years will ever be overthr 
But we can expose the difficulties and perhaps suggest a ~ modifications. 
rna leading case is Brown v. ~al1~~r1 decided in 1895, where the defendant 
claimed that he need not reply to :LTJt.errogai;1on even though there was a federal. 
statui;.~ grant:L.-,g him full inmrunity from prosocution.. The court admitted that 
the statute co uld not shield the defendant £ronl the personal disP.',race and 
opprobrium which would follow upon the exposure of his crime, but decided that 
if the PIPOposed testim:>ny was material. to the issues of the trial., then the rae 
that his answers might tend to degracie him did not exe~t him from the duty of 
disc 10 sine the same. 
A person who commits a crimina.l act is bound to coate~late the conse-
quences of exposure to his good nama and reputation, and OugJ:lt not to call 
upon the courts to protect that wh...tch he himself' esteemed to be ot such 
little value. The safety and welfare of the entire community should not 
be put into the sode Ag.mst the reputation of a selt'....oonfessed criminal, 
'Who ought not. either in Jus'tice or good mrals" to refuse to disclose 
that wtlioh may be of great public utUi1;y .. in order that his neighbors 1'iUV" 
17 
think nll of him.. The cktsign of the oonstitutional privilege is not to 
aid the wttnesa in vindicating hischaracter, but to protect him against 
being compelled to furnish evidence to oonvict him of a criminal charge. 
If he secures legal i1ll!lunity from pIYOSecutlon, the possible impairment of 
his good name is a penalty !iiCh it is reasonable he should be compelled 
to pay for the common good. 
Perhaps the best defense ever formulated of theFifth Amndment and the 
rights of the individual WSfl that of r.~. Justice Field in his dissenting 
opinion to the holding of Brown v. Wd'ker. He maintained that the framers of 
the Fifth AlnendIoont intended to save the witness in all oases fro,:l the shame 
and infanw ot confessing disgraceful crimes, and thus preserve to him sorre 
measure of sal£-respect. The oonstituticmal privilege reflects "the abhorrence 
felt at the le~~al com;>ul.sion upon witnesses to L.1.ake concessions vd1ich must OOVel 
the wi tIless '''T1 th lasting shame and leave him degraded ~oth in his own eyes and 
those of pthers. "'hat can be more abhorrent. • • tihan to compel a lllm1 who had 
fought his way from obscurity to dignity and honor to reveal crims of which 
he had repented and of which the \vorld was ignorant. And it is very justl,y 
urged that a statute is not a full equivaldnt under which a Ydtness mey be com--
• 
palled to cover himself with the tnf'anv of e cri.me, even though he TIlI!V be ar:m8C 
with a nroteotion against its merely penal. consequences.n)2 
!,fr. Justice Field could cit. as authority for bis position the case of 
,~ni.ted States v. James, decided iTl the federal oO!.Jrts the year before.33 There 
Ju<l,~ Grosscup held that the immun:lty statute involved violated the Fourth and 
n.r-tib. Ar~wndloonts. The Jud:.;e believt'lu that the Fifth Amencboont secured to the 
3lsrown v. Walker, 161 US 894 (1895). 
32!k.~. 
3360 F. 257 (1894). 
"I'. 
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individual his right ot silence against the right of the government to seek out 
data for an accusation; that it was rooa.:lt to protect the witness against the 
practical effect of outl~J, as well as the law-inflicted per~lties a~d for-
feitures. Ii' not, the government could probe the secretes of every conversa-
tion or society by extending pardon to one of its pm-ticipants, and thns turn 
him into an involuntar,r informer. PThe oppression ot crowns and prinCipalities 
is unquestionably over, but the more frightful oppression ot seUish, ruthless, 
and merciless majorities Il'lIJY yet constitute one of the chapters or future his-
tor,y. In ~ opinion, the privilege of silence, against criminal acctb~ation, 
guaranteed by the Fifth Amend1lent, was meant to extend to all tho consequences 
of disclosure ... 34 
fuming for a moment to a lOOre recent case, we find the SSl'lW:l question 
coming up again in Ullman v. unita~ States.35 Here the immunit~r statu.te under 
attack was that passed by Congrees in 1954 seeking to expedite investigation in 
the area of national security. The petitioner sought to distinglJish .Brown v. 
Walker on the ~md that Itthe i~act of the·,disabilities ~osed by' federal 
and state authorities and the public in genera!-such BS 108s of ~iob. expulSion 
fromlabor unions, state registration and investigation statutes, passport in-
eligibility, and general public opprobrium-is so oppressive that the statute 
does not give him true immurrl:l;y.n.36 
34n,id. 
35350 US 422 (1956). 
36Ibid. 
~-~ 
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M:tster Justice Frankfurter replied in his majority opinion that ttthe inter-
diction of the rUth Amendment operates only where a witness is asked to in-
crimi..'lste himsell'-in other words to e;ive testinnny which may possibl,r expose 
him to a crimtnal charge. But if the criminality has already betm taken tI.fnitT" 
the Amendment ceases to apply • .,37 
In 8 strong dissent, Mr. Justice Ihuglu .. with Justice Black concurring, 
pointed out the numerous disabillt,ie.'3 ereated by federal law that attach to a 
person 'Who is a communist-inel1gibility for t9ntlloyment in the federal govern-
ment or defense facilities, etc. These, he insisted, are forfeitute3 within 
the .meaning of American cases and as much protected by the Fi.fth A.'IlJen&1ent as 
crittrl.nal prosecution itself. But since these forfeitures are not nrevented by 
the immunity statute, it must bes~wk down. For as the court had held in 
Counsel~ v. ~i tchcock, an immunlty st.atute, to be valid, must Itsuppl,y a com-
plete !>retect1on .from all the }>er:iJ.s against whioh the constitutional prohibi-
tion wu desi~d to guard.,a.38 
• 
Another objeotion to immunity statutes i.-s· that they are ofttm. no guarantee 
even against prosecution and imprlGoni:lCnt. Federal imuni ty doe~: not bind state 
prosecutors, nor does state imrrmrrl.ty bind federal prosecutors. This result is 
based on the legal fiction that federal oourts cannot be expected to take 
notice of the laws of the states and vice versa. The injustice to any witness 
whose misdeed was a crime in both jurisdiotions is manifest' His immunized 
testimony ill the feeleral cou.rt can be takel\ down by a state prosecutor and used 
--------
37Ibid. 
-
.38142 US 547 (1891). 
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to convict him in a subsequent state trial, or vice versa. 
As I indicated earlier it would be impractical at this late dat~ to attempt 
to overthrow the bed-rock foundation of irrenu.nity statutes, n('lr vlO'J.ld it be wise; 
for however e;reat the harm to the individual, the beneti ts to the State and the 
coll'tmn good are overriding. I also believe that the majority view, holdlng 
imlrruni ty statl,ltes an adequate substitute for t.l-te Fifth !roondment, reortrysents 
the mind of the Founding Fathers. As a simple test of this, l'lh,v were the words 
"in a crlmtnal case" deliberate33 added to the Amendroont upon the rrntion of Mre 
Lawrence?.39 The rea80nable llL"lmmr seems to be that reached by the c:::tTts-the 
intention of the men who drew up the Amendment was only to shield a defendant 
f1'o1:1 the onus of' furniShing the evidence that would convict hin or a criroo, IIrl:I' 
, -
any nther consequences must be borne by hi:'4 
To make sure that a defendant en; vdtnass is protedted !'rom ae1£-cmw1.ctio 
I wou.ld sue;gest a law or Congress mR.ktnr; any immu.'1ity statute binding U1)(m ~ 
st..ate and federal authorities. It would also have to provide that immunity 
• 
could not be offered to a witness without thee prior consent of t,he Justioe 
Departments of both sovreignties. 
That should eliminate one ob.jection to i!$tunity statutes. The other, con-
cerning the disgrace and infB.ne:" of t."1e witness, cannot be 'Wholly eradicated. 
But I should think ~lat the harnd\tJL cor~equences could be oontrolled and great 
reduced. In England the testimo~ of a vdtness before Parliament is not allowe 
40 to £;0 beyond the nlls. Not lonr; ago masked ref'ueees testified before our 
-
39Carter R. Pittman" "The Fifijl:l P:~:ndl'Ient,tf' 42 ~ 509. 
40n>id. 593. 
-
Congress, and the fact that their identity was known but to a very few did not 
seem to i~ir the value of their testimony-. Admitted1.y there may he times 
when testirony would have no value lIDless the SOJrce were di..selosed, but in-
tellieent safeguards would minillrize the damage to the rel?utation of the 1m-
A proper regard for the dignity and Wlrth of the individual and due con-
sideration for the value of his good name, should make us abhor wanton des-
truction of a tellow man, and seek by every means to return the witness to 
8Ociet.y AS little harmed as possible. 
These mea~, while short of the ideal; would go III long wlq to ':H~otect 
the witness from all the perils to vlhieh the L"mltllnity statutes have exposed h1Ia.. 
I 
i' 
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CHAPrEl~ VI 
CONCLUSION 
This final. chapter w:Ul consist of a summary of the facts and findings of 
this topic. The priv'J.lege against self-incrimination derives from the ma:xim 
"~ tenetur prodere 8etpsum-Iloboctr is bound to accuse himself. Thia 
privUege developed in England where untu well into the nineteenth century., 
there wre three distinct systems of courtsi comroon 1_, equity, and ecclesi-
astiCal, each of which had developed oTer the centuries its own :node of 
procedure. 
It was during the period of the Inglish Comroonwealth that the privilege 
became general. Its immediate origin was in pDOtest against a procedural oath 
of the ecclesiastical. courts. the oath!! officio. The practice before such 
courts was than arvona aocused I!!! fa~, us~ by two witnesses, had to deny 
the charge by oath ewn before trial or stand accused by' his own s ilenee. 
The trial of John L:Ubum fooused the attention of England on the ex 
-
officio procedure. Four years later, 161.&:4 the Star Chanber and the Court of 
-
Hir.,h Commission and the ex officio procedure wre abolished. The effect was 
- I 
felt in the cOJmll)n law courts and, according to some, becam such an integral 
part of cOJllll)n law criminal procedure during the subsequent years that it was 
taken for granted and not even mentioned in the Bill of Riehts of 1689. 
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In America the privilege gained ground steadily even to this day, but not 
without increasing opposition. So much attention has been called to the privi-
lege of late as to warrant a study of its nature and function, whioh this thesis 
has sought to do. The first quest:'-on to arise was whether the Fifth Amendment 
was a natural right. It seemed clear upon investigation that the American 
courts had newr considered it so, refusing consistently to include it among 
the basic rights guaranteed to all Ameridan citizens by the Constitution. 
Annng scholastics there tlas no t been too much work done on this particular 
point of Ii natural right not in incriminate oneself. All we co:ud do w_ argue 
.from analogy-. If every man has a natural right to his good reputation, then 
perhaps he also has· a natural. right to refrain from disclosi.nr, anything that 
would destroy that reputation. 
Of course that is the whole t"!u8stion. Does a criminal hav'e such a right 
and Saint Thomas would answer ftno.!t The problem really goes deeper. In the 
e.yes of the State, a man is not a criminal until convicted. Therefore to s~ 
that a criminal does not have a rl.,~ht to silence l1l8"'J be clear en('nu:~h~' bnt does 
a suspect have no such right? For ,.,00 can know who is a criminal until trial 
and oonviction? Short of this we run t."1e risk or unjustl;;r denying to an 
innocent party what we could justly deny to a criminal if we knew he were a 
~ ~ -- ..-- -...-...- ...... ------- ... 
criminal, which we do not. lb:'. Justice Brandeis expressed this v.re~l in OJ.m,.. 
-
Stead v. United States. 
The n18..1{ers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to 
the pursuit of happiness. Th8'J reoogniz.ed the significance or man's 
spiritual. nature, of his fee~s and of his intellect. They knew that 
o~ a part or the pain, pleasure and satisfactions or life are to be 
found in material things. The:J s01J.ght to protect Americans fn thtdr be-
liefs •. their thoughts, their e:.mtions, and their sensations. They con-
terred as against the Government.. the rirrht to be let alone-the mst 
'i' 
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comprehensive of rights and the right !J.J)st valued by civilized men. To 
protect that right, every fmjustifiable intrusion by the Govermoont upon 
the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, limst be deemed 
6. violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as evidenoe in Ii 
crimin.l proceeding, of ficts ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed 
I! violation of the Fifth. 
On the other hand, a suspect is a suspect precisely because there is Ii 
~~dr S!llOunt of e,,"idence 8ssociatiniS hL:i1 vdth the crime. It is l:,ossible that at 
rt,his point the COmJlX)n good intervenes in favor of unshackling the police power 
pf the State at the expense of private interests-hera, those of the suspect. 
~e risk involved is evident and the solution requires a nice balancing of 
~nterests. Many other jurisdictions. thus far at least, have cast up the 
~alance and fomt it wanting in regard to the privllege. 
It has been !I\V own conclusion that the privilege is not a natural right. 
This in turn raiSed the second question, whether the AnDndment should he re-
tained nevertheless. After a review of all the arguments for and ngainst, it 
seerood best to deny the right to a defendant at the tr'l.al prn)er, ;)!-eser-vin[; it 
to hi~il at all times prior to the tria).. Witnesses, however, "vvDuld remain i'ully 
pnttected. The defendant lost his right to Silence, in nw opinion, 'when 
sufficient evidence was offered to WQXTant an indictn:l.ent. This is not, t,rus of 
a witness. No evidence of al\'! [:,u.ilt on ~lis part has been presented and so his 
~i~~ht to the privilege shou.ld remain '~::..."1i;llpaired. 
The evidenoe of the witness, it is true, m.-r be vital for t he national 
i:n'"erest, t!i.e cOnJ.;ron good. In this case, the witness must yield his !'i.ght to 
the privllege in favor of the :nero H":'Gont right of the State t.:> his testi:mny. 
1277 US 438 (1928). 
Ii 
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The State :i.n addition should take whatever steps are necessar;).r to sJ,,:.1.old ·t.he 
I 
witness as far as possible from an;:r 10s8 as a result, of h:':'D e'~opC)ration. 
defin:t tive treatment of SOr'oC fascinat,:tng aspects of the Fifth A:Je!ldTl~nt. 
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